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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the German specific Holocaust denial law and the New Zealand general hate 
speech law and their interferences with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. The main argument is 
that the current legislation - regarding both countries - contains insufficiencies. While the prohibition of the 
"simple" Auschwitz Deception in section 130 (3) of the German Crin1inal Code in cases of judgmental 
statements leads to an infringement of the underlying dogmatics and justifications of the German Basic Law, the 
New Zealand approach leads to an insufficient scope of protection regarding Holocaust denying statements 
under section 131 of the Human Rights Act. As recent incidents of Holocaust denial- in Europe and in New 
Zealand - show, fighting against Holocaust denial via legislation gains high importance. Thus, it is concluded 
that the German jurisdiction should adjust the scope of protection of freedom of expression by excluding not 
only wrong facts, but also judgmental statements which are based on wrong facts from the scope of protection . 
In contrast, it is suggested that the New Zealand legislature should narrow the thresholds required under section 
131 to enable the punishment of Holocaust denying statements. 
Word Length: 
The text of this research paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography, 
and appendices) comprises approximately 16,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
1 am not happy when censorship wms, and I don't believe in wmnmg battles via 
censorship ... The way of fighting Holocaust deniers is with history and with truth.
1 
These words by Deborah Lipstadt, historian and author of the book "Denying the 
Holocaust", after Holocaust denier David Irving was found guilty in Austria2, constitute a 
clear statement pro freedom of expression. Despite her bitter history and debate with Irving, 
Lipstadt stands up for the right "as being of central importance in a democratic state".
3 
Freedom of expression is a value which is quintessential to a liberal democratic society.
4 This 
applies to speech which finds a broad consent in society as well as to opinions of minorities. 
However, one has to ask whether the protection should be admitted for hate speech, or the 
expression of Holocaust denying statements, too. 
Having a look at the daily press of the last months, one has to ascertain that Holocaust 
denial and thus, the question of its interference with freedom of expression is becoming 
increasingly pervasive. This especially, as the increase of the Internet enables a fast and far 
reaching dissemination of Holocaust denying statements. Recent cases like the conviction of 
European Holocaust deniers, the German lawyer Sylvia Stolz on 8
th of May 20095 and the 
Austrian Gerd Honsik in April 2009
6 and the Holocaust denying statements by the British 
bishop Richard Williamson yet again show the vitality of the issue. However, despite the 
continuous growth of neo-Nazi political movements targeting their hostility towards Jews in 
Europe and Germany7, the problem of Holocaust Denial or racist speech with special regard 
to Jews is not solely a European or German one. 
1 "Holocaust Denier Irving is jailed" (20 February 2006) BBC News http://news.bbc.co. uk (accessed 6 
November 2009). 
2 Irving was sentenced to three years in prison because of denying the Holocaust of European Jewry. Irving had 
clain1ed in 1998 that Lipstadt had libelled him in her book "Denying the Holocaust" . The judge ruled in favour 
of Lipstadt, for further in fom1ation see: Irving v Penguin Books Ltd, Deborah Lips tacit (2000) WLR 3624 78 
(HC QBD). 
3 Grant Huscroft and Paul Rish worth (ed) Rights and Freedoms New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Human 
Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington , 1995) 173 for New Zealand with reference to the White Paper which 
proposed the Bill of Rights Act. 
4 See Steven J Heyman Free Speech and Human Dignity (Yale Univer ity Press, New Haven and London , 2008) 
I; Win fried Brugger "Yerbot oder Schutz von Hassrede? Rechtsvergleichende Beobachtungen zwn deutschen 
und ameri_kanischen Recht" (2003) 128 AoeR 372; A lexander Tsesis "Dignity and Speech: The regulation of 
hate speech in a democracy" (2009) 44 Wake Forest LR 497 . 
5 See Julia Jiittner "Friiulein Stolz und der Hitlergrul3" (9 May 2009) www.spiegel.de (accessed 6 November 
2009). 
6 See Manfred Seeh "Wiederbetiitigung: Funf Jahre Haft fur Gerd Honsik" (28 April 2009) http://diepresse.com 
(accessed 6 November 2009). 
7 See Geoffrey Bindman "Outlawing Holocaust denial" (1997) 147 NLR 466. 
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During the research for this paper, a number of students from Lincoln University in 
Canterbury (near Clu·istchurch) dressed as Nazis and concentration camp inmates for an 
Oktoberfest Party organised by one of their university's halls of residence. 
8 Besides the 
clothes showing Nazi slogans like "Sieg Heil!" and "Hitler's my boi", the students "were 
heiling to Hitler and making tasteless jokes about one of the darkest periods of human 
history."9 Press releases out of the same week report on Iran's president Mahmoud 
Admadinejad, speaking before a crowd of supporters at Teheran University. During that 
speech Admadinejad "questioned whether the Holocaust was a 'real event' and called it a 
pretext for the creation of Israel. He said the Jewish state was founded on 'a lie and a 
mythical claim'."
10 
While the latter statement can constitute a criminal offence under the German 
Criminal Code, as this provides under certain circumstances for a conviction in case of the 
denial of the Holocaust as an event of historical fact, the same statement may not lead to any 
legal consequences in other countries, such as New Zealand. This is caused by the fact that 
only a few countries have enacted special laws to criminalise the sole expression of Holocaust 
denial, whilst most of the countries have made hate speech or the incitement to racial hatred in 
general a punishable offence. 
11 Such legislation seeks to uphold the rights of racial minorities 
to equality and dignity and to live free from discrimination and persecution.
12 This is justified 
by the argument, that a legal system, pursuing to establish peace and order, does not have to 
protect hate or hate speech as this may lead to violence. However, hate speech may have its 
own nuances which make it more difficult to draw clear boundaries between the protection of 
speech and the prohibition of hate speech. Moreover, one has to take into consideration that 
restrictions to freedom of expression have to be within the limits prescribed by the particular 
law. This problem gets virulent regarding provisions explicitly prohibiting Holocaust denial. 
Hence, keeping Deborah Lipstadt's words in mind, this paper examines the important 
issue of which kind of "censorship" is an appropriate approach to fight Holocaust deniers and 
8 See "University apologises for students in Nazi garb" (21 September 2009) www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 26 
September 2009) . 
9 Ibid. 
'
0 The New Zealand Herald "Iranian opposition supporters crash state rallies" (19 September 2009) 
http: //www.nzherald.co.nz (accessed 26 September 2009); "Ahmadinedschad nennt Holocaust ein 'Miirchen"'
 
(18 September 2009) http: //www.spiegel.de (accessed 23 September 2009); M Amedeo Tw11olillo 
"Ahmadinedjad Goes on ' Larry King Life"' (26 September 2009) The Lede TI1e New York Times News Biog 
http: //thelede.blogs.nytimes.com (accessed 23 October 2009) . 
11 Such as in New Zealand, see V. 
12 
Juliet Moses "Hate Speech: Competing Rights to Freedom of Expression" (1996-1999) 8 Auck U LR 185. 
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how far we can stretch the fundamental right of freedom of expression. By comparing the 
current and specific German Holocaust denial law to the more general New Zealand hate 
speech law, this paper analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches and 
their interferences with freedom of expression. The paper argues that the German approach is 
broader in its scope than the New Zealand one as it covers all kinds of Holocaust denying 
statements. Thus, regarding the protection of the legally protected good the broad scope 
means an advantage. Moreover, the paper argues that same advantage can mean a 
disadvantage as Holocaust deniers have more opportunities to appear in court rooms and to 
disseminate their manipulative thoughts. In addition, the paper finds that the New Zealand 
approach is more consistent with the right to freedom of expression than the German one and 
that it limits this fundamental right in a less restrictive way. This paper shows that the current 
section 130 (3) German Criminal Code (GCC) leads to insufficiencies regarding the 
justification ofa limitation of article 5 of the Basic Law, the freedom of expression. It argues 
that Holocaust denying statements - and thus wrong facts - in a judgmental context are 
capable of falling under the scope of freedom of expression, but that section 130 (3) does not 
qualify as a justified limitation to the right of freedom of expression. In contrast, section 131 
of the Human Rights Act (HRA) is a justified limitation to section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 
(BORA). This paper suggests that the German legislature should adjust the legal 
insufficiencies by excluding not only wrong facts , but also judgmental statements which are 
based on wrong facts from the scope of protection under article 5 of the Basic Law. 
Moreover, the paper proposes that New Zealand should maintain its general hate speech 
approach to fight against Holocaust deniers. However, this paper argues that section 131 HRA 
should be amended regarding its high thresholds and strict criteria as reality has shown and 
shows that recent incidents do not fulfil the criteria of the provision. 
The first part of this paper defines Holocaust denial and gives a brief overview of the 
institutions and main figures who promote Holocaust denial - or as they call it - revisionism 
13 
in the public. 
The second part of this paper addresses Holocaust denial in the broader context of hate 
speech and freedom of expression by working out the nature of the existing laws against 
Holocaust denial. It scrutinises the rationale underlying hate speech and tries to adapt this 
harm rationale to the denying of the historical fact of the Holocaust. Moreover, this part will 
13 See Robert A Kahn Holocaust Denial and the Law (a comparative study) (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2004) 2. 
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analyse the rationales underlying freedom of expression and find arguments for and against a 
legislative intervention regarding hate speech. 
Paii three of this paper analyses whether section 130 (3) GCC, which prohibits the 
denying of Auschwitz (specific Holocaust denial law), is a justified restriction to the freedom 
of expression, guaranteed under article 5 of the German Basic Law. First, it will describe the 
development of section 130 (3) and its underlying jurisdiction. However, it will focus on the 
relationship between the Holocaust denial law and freedom of expression and provide 
solutions to solve the existing legal problems and inaccuracies. 
Pa1i four of this paper constitutes the equivalent of paii three, outlining the New 
Zealand response to Holocaust denial. As the New Zealand legislation does not contain a 
specific Holocaust denial law this paper analyses its coverage under the hate speech provision 
of section 131 HRA and scrutinises its interference with freedom of expression. 
The last part of this paper compares the two different approaches by showing 
advantages and disadvantages of the regulations and provides some arguments for which 
approach should be taken. 
II HOLOCAUST DENIERS - WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY BELIEVE 
A Holocaust Denial - a Definition 
"I shall call ' revisionism' the doctrine according to which the genocide practiced by 
Nazi Germany against Jews and Gypsies did not exist but is to be regarded as a myth, a fable, 
or a hoax." 14 
Holocaust deniers or as they call themselves revisionists, assert that the Nazi 
Holocaust of the Jews never happened. 15 Among other reasons, such as anti-Semitism the 
denial and downgrading of the Holocaust pursues the purpose of rehabilitating the ideas of 
National Socialism as a form of society by serving as neo-Nazi propaganda. 
14 Pierre Vidal-Naquet Assassins of Memo1y Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1987) 79. 
15 Robert A Kahn , above n 13, 2; The Danish Center for Holocaust Denial and Genocide Studies 
www.holocaust-education.dk (accessed 10 November 2009). 
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B Personalities and Institutions 
Nowadays 16 Holocaust denial 1s not only a problem which occurs in Germany or 
continental Europe where it mainly has its roots. It is a vital phenomenon in many parts of the 
world that threatens governments and those who are targeted by it. Although there exists an 
alarming racist and anti-Zionist propagandistic movement within Arabian countries, this 
examination will just point out one institution and one personality denying the Holocaust out 
of the western world. 
I The Institute for Historical Review 
The Institute for Historical Review was founded in 1978 by the American Willis Carta 
who is also the publisher of several ultra-conservative and mildly anti-Jewish magazines. 17 
What led to the founding of the Institute was the preceding publication of various Holocaust-
denial literatures, which had reached its peak in the 1960s. The first publication during that 
time was The Drama of the European Jews 18 by the French "historian" Paul Rassinier, who 
had been imprisoned in the concentration camp Buchenwald for his socialist beliefs during 
World War II. Although relying on unsupported assertions and highly questionable 
evidence 19, Rassinier's publication provided a basis and inspiration for a second generation of 
Holocaust deniers, which found coverage under the IHR.20 
Today the IHR is led by Mark Weber and has its headquarters in California. While 
historians and critics describe the IHR as a pseudo-scientific think tank, the founders and 
members of the institute understand the organisation as an "educational, public interest 
research and publishing center [that strives] to bring history into accord with the facts. "21 
16 For the origins of Holocaust denial see Ben S Austin "A Brief History of Holocaust Denial" 
http ://frank.mtsu.edu/-baustin/denhist.htm (accessed 27 September 2009); see Peter R Teachout "Making 
' Holocaust Denial' a crin1e: reflections on European anti-negationist laws from the perspective of US 
constitutional experience" (2006) 30 YtLR 655, 661. 
17 See Kenneth Lasson "Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Trnth in a Free Society'' 
(1997-1998) 6 Geo Mas L Rev 35 , 41. 
18 Paul Rassinier l e Drame desjuifs europeens (Le Sept Couleurs, Paris, 1962/64) translated by Harry Elmer 
Barnes The Drama of the European Jews (Steppingstones Publications, Silver Spring MD, 1975, foreword by 
Michael Hardesty) . 
19 See Peter R Teachout, ee abo en 16,661 ; Richard J Evans Lying about Hitler: Hist01y, Holocaust and the 
David Irving Trial (Basic Books, New York, 200 I) . 
20 See ibid , 662. Further publications were for example Arthur Butz The Hoax of the Twentieth Centwy: The 
Case Against the Presumed Exterminations of European Jew,y (Theses & Dissertations Press, Chicago, 1976) 
David Irving Hitler's War (Hodder & Stoughton, London, The Viking Press, New York, 1977). For further 
publications during that time and their publication w1der the IHR see founder of the IHR William Carto "A 
Brief History of Holocaust Revisionism" in Germar Rudolf (nom de plwne) (ed) Dissecting the Holocaust The 
Growing Critique of Truth and Memo,y (2 ed, Theses & Dissertations Press, 2003) 579-581 . 
2 1 The Institute for llistorical Review www.ihr.org/main/about (accessed 11 November 2009). 
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However, commentators have rightly criticised this understanding of the Institute being 
misleading. Paul Rauber, for example, comments that
22 
TI1e question [of whether the IHR denies the Holocaust] appears to tum on IHR's Humpty-
Dumpty word game with the word Holocaust. According to Mark Weber, associate editor of 
the IHR's Journal of Historical Review [now Director of the IHR], "Ifby the 'Holocaust' you 
mean the political persecution of Jews, some scattered killings, if you mean a cruel thing that 
happened, no one denies that. But if one says that the 'Holocaust' means the systematic 
extermination of six to eight million Jews in concentration camps, that's what we think there's 
not evidence for." Tirnt is, IHR doesn't deny that the Holocaust happened; they just deny that 
the word 'Holocaust' means what people customarily use it for. 
Besides conferences which were held by the IHR throughout the last years, the 
institute uses its Journal of Historical Review as a voice for their movement, populated by a 
handful of highly motivated individuals, including Mark Weber, David Irving, Robert 
Faurisson and Ernst Zundel. 23 
2 David Irving 
One of the individuals m the Holocaust denial movement is David Irving. He is a 
British writer who disseminates his views denying the Holocaust in public and thus, has 
brought the Holocaust on trial heaps of times. The publication of "Denying Holocaust" by 
Deborah Lipstadt in 1993 in which she describes Irving as someone "who ha[s] frequently 
proposed extremely controversial theories about the Holocaust, including the claim that Hitler 
had no knowledge of it, has become a Holocaust denier"24 led to lrving's first appearance in a 
courtroom, bringing an unsuccessful libel case against Lipstadt. Instead, the trial revealed him 
as a "right-wing pro- azi polemicist".25 Moreover, Irving was convicted of glorifying and 
identifying with the German Nazi-Party in Austria and served a prison sentence. 
One of his last appearances in public was in relation to the protest and turmoil around 
bishop Richard Williamson who had denied the Holocaust in February 2009 and who had 
22 See Paul Rauber ( 17 January 1992) East Bay Express San Francisco 4 see 
http: //www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi /documents (accessed 27 September 2009). The author of this paper wants to 
repudiate from Weber's statement. 
23 
Michael Shem1er and Alex Grobman Denying Histo,y Who says the Holocaust ne,•er happened and why do 
they say it? (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000) 42. 
24 Deborah Lipstadt Denying the Holocaust (The Free Press, New York, 1993) 111. 
25 Richard J Evans, above n 19, 228 quoting the judge of the trial, Mr. Justice Gray. 
1 1 
asked Irving how to present his views without causing an angry backlash. 26 Hereupon, Irving 
was quoted "He is not a Holocaust denier. Like me, he does not buy the whole package."27 
This quotation is stressed by the fact that Irving officially disclaims to affiliate with the IHR 
and that he aspires to the respect of the scholarly historical community for the work he has 
done with Nazi documents which were found to be extremely valuable in understanding 
German and Nazi historiography. 28 However, Irving often speaks at IHR conventions and 
lectures to denier groups around the world activity at least suggesting that he is an 
apologist for the Holocaust deniers, if not for Hitler and the Nazis. 29 
C What they deny 
Most modem definitions of Holocaust denial focus on the dismissal of three main 
points which are contained in many Holocaust definitions. 30 
The first assertion concerns the fact that an estimated six million Jews were killed 
during World War II. The suggestion of this number of Jewish victims is judged by deniers to 
be too high. "Anywhere from 300,000 to one or two million Jews died or were killed in 
ghettos and camps."31 The second historical fact they deny, is the existence of the poison gas 
chambers in Auschwitz and other concentration camps with the intention to use them as an 
extermination program. "Scientific experiments show that gas was not used to kill people, but 
only for disinfections."32 Furthermore, Holocaust deniers assert that there was no intention to 
commit genocide of Jews based on racial ideology. The Nazi policy was just in pursuit of 
deporting Jews, but not of killing them. These three main claims are sometimes specified or 
subdivided into statements, such as that the gas chambers had holes in their roofs or that the 
gas chamber in Auschwitz is a fake for tourists. 33 
26 See "Holocaust row bishop Richard Williamson contacts David lrving" (26 February 2009) 
www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed 30 September 2009). 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Peter R Teachout, see above n 16, 666. Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, above n 23, 48 give an 
example for this double-sided nature of Holocaust-denial historiography quoting German historian Hans 
Mommsen, who had endorsed Irving for his work in 1978. However, as Irving proudly displayed this 
statement on his website, Mommsen requested its removal due to Lrving's judgments on the Holocaust. 
29 Michael Shenner and Alex Grobman, above n 23, 49. 
30 See ibid, I 00; TI1e Danish Center for Holocaust Denial and Genocide Studies, see above n 15; Ilolocaust 
Denial on Trial www.hdot.org/en/denial (accessed 11 November 2009) for further explanation. 
31 See Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, above n 23 , I 00 quoting from Bradley Smith's advertisement in 
college newspapers. 
32 The Danish Center for Holocaust Denial and Genocide Studies, above n 15. 
33 See Holocaust Denial on Trial, above n 30. 
12 
D Why they are wrong 
Although these asse1tions are known historical facts and historians agree that the 
Holocaust happened34, there has always been a debate concerning single issues. Therefore, 
this section aims to give some of the most important evidence for these historical facts, whilst 
showing at the same time, how Holocaust deniers - or as they call themselves historical 
revisionists - "massage and mangle the evidence to suit their ideological agenda".
35 
Regarding the assertion that gas chambers and crematoria were not used for genocide, 
but only for delousing clothing36, Holocaust deniers misuse quotations by divorcing them 
from their context. As an example, one can refer to historian Arno Mayer who concluded in 
his book Why Did the Heavens Not Darken that "Sources for the study of the gas chambers 
are at once rare and unreliable."37 However, Mayer did neither suggest by saying so that gas 
chambers were not used for genocide nor that they did not exist. This becomes clear by the 
context of the quotation which refers to the fact that there are just rare studies concerning this 
fact as the SS destroyed most camp records as well as it razed the crematoria. 38 However, 
there are different kinds of evidence, such as eye-witness accounts, photographs and Zyklon-
B gas traces on the walls of the gas chambers to prove that gas chambers were used for 
genocide. 39 Just recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held aloft two 
documents - a copy of the minutes of the Wannsee Conference, in which Nazi officials 
planned the Final Solution that led to the killing of six million Jews and the original blueprints 
of the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps at the UN, rebutting Ahmadinedjad's Holocaust 
denying statements.40 "They contain a signature by Heinrich Hirnmler, Hitler's deputy 
himself Are these plans of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp where one million 
Jews were murdered ... a lie, too?" 
34 So does the author of this text. 
35 Peter R Teachout, see above n 16, 664. 
36 
See Fred Leuchter The Leuchter Report-The End of a Myth www.revisionists.com (accessed 10 November 
2009). 
37 A J Mayer Why Did the Heavens Not Darken (Pantheon, New York, 1990) 362. 
38 
Ibid. "Sources for the study of the gas chambers are at once rare and Wlreliable. Even though Hitler and the 
azis made no secret of their war on the Jews, the SS operatives dutifully eliminated all traces of their 
murderous activities and instrW11ent. No written orders for gassing have turned up thus far. The SS not only 
destroyed most camp records, which were in any case incomplete, but also razed nearly all killing and 
cremating insta llation s well before the arrival of Soviet troops. Likewise, care was taken to dispose of the 
bones and ashes of the victims." 
39 
See Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, see above n 23 , 127; Holocaust Denial on Trial "Myth/Fact Sheets", 
see above n 30. 
40 
See 1l1e New York Times" etanyahu Attacks Ahmadinedjad's Holocaust Denial" (24 September 2009) 
www.nytimes.com (accessed 10 ovember 2009). 
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Regarding the scope and scale of the Holocaust, deniers put an equation mark between 
different historical interpretations of numbers of victims. The figure of six million is an 
estimate deriving from demographic research, based on the registered numbers of Jews before 
and after the war, emigrated Jews living in other countries, number of deported Jews and so 
on. As historians have diverging "calculation methods" the exact numbers of estimated Jewish 
losses vary mainly within the range of 4,600,000 to over 6,000,000 million. 41 Holocaust 
deniers use these diverging numbers to state that the whole Holocaust is a false construction. 
However, just by coming to different results, one cannot deny the fact of Holocaust denial. 
With regard to other groups killed by the Nazis, such as gypsies, Poles, Serbs, mentally or 
physically handicapped people or political opponents the total number is even higher.42 
The fact that they [the numbers] do not come out the same but are within a reasonable range 
of error variance gives us assurance that somewhere between the earlier estimates of five 
million and more recent estimates of six million Jews died in the Holocaust. 
The above described Holocaust denier David Irving is one of the main advocates that 
Hitler did not know about the Holocaust or that he did not have the intention for genocide, 
referring to quotes from Hitler. 43 After the publication of his book Hitler's war he offered 
1 OOO to anyone who could produce a written order as documentary proof that Hitler ordered 
the Holocaust.44 However, there exist documents such as a letter signed by Hitler, authorising 
the killing of the handicapped. 45 This is a piece of evidence stressing the fact that "if the Nazis 
were willing to kill their own people, it is reasonable then to assume they could kill people 
whom they considered alien and whom they viewed as a cancer on society - the Jews. "46 
Moreover, the Wannsee conference documents reflect Hitler's real intent; Part I of the 
protocol is a listing of who took part in the conference on the Final Solution (Endlosung) of 
the Jewish question. Reading the document in the context of Hitler's politics and the theories 
published in is book Mein Kampf his real intent, to kill the Jews, becomes obvious. 47 
41 See Appendix l : Historian 's Estimates of Jewish Losses in Each Country. 
42 Michael Shenner and Alex Grobman, see above n 23, 174. 
43 David Irving, see above n 20, 427. 
44 See Andrew Walker "Profile: David Irving" (20 February 2006) BBC News http: //news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
45 See Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, above n 23, 204. 
46 Ibid , l O l. 
47 The Wannsee Protocol includes paragraphs, such as "The remnan that eventually remains will require suitable 
treatment; because it will without doubt represent the most resistand part, it consits of a natrual selection that 
could, on ist release, become the germ-cell of a new Jewish revival." 
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These examples show how institutions and individuals misuse evidence and historical 
facts for their own purposes to deny the Holocaust. Therefore, they try to undermine and 
functionalise their statements as racist or propagandistic. 
III HOLOCAUST DENIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Thus, to have a full understanding of the problems that arise while answering the 
research question with special regard to the Gennan and New Zealand jurisdiction one has to 
examine Holocaust denial in the broader context of hate speech and freedom of expression. 
Therefore, this section aims to discuss the various reasons for and against regulating hate 
speech in general, its interference with the fundamental right to freedom of expression and its 
application to particular Holocaust denial laws. 
A The Nature of the Laws against Holocaust Denial 
To scrutinise the nature of the laws against Holocaust denial, one has to distinguish 
between different kinds of laws. A number of European countries have laws on their books 
making Holocaust denial explicitly or implicitly a crime, such as Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain and Switzerland.48 However, the laws of these countries differ from each 
other regarding the elements of the offence, the sentencing and have different nuances. While 
some countries criminalise both, Holocaust denial and the promotion of Nazi ideology 
through speech, symbols or public association, others concentrate on one aspect. Moreover, it 
is worth to mention that countries like Romania and Lithuania, despite having explicit denial 
laws on the books, enforce them sporadically. 49 
During its EU Presidency Germany tried to put the fight against racism throughout 
Europe back on the political agenda, focussing on the enactment of a specific Holocaust 
denial law binding the whole Union. 50 This proposal took place in the context of the 
48 
Compare Dominic McGoldrick and Therese O'Donnell "Hate-speech laws: consistency with national and 
international human rights law" ( 1998) 18 Legal Studies 453, 456; Michael J Bazyler "Holocaust Denial Laws 
and Other Legislation Criminalizing Promotion ofNazism" (2006) wwwl .yadvashem.org (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
49 See Michael J Bazyler, see above n 48. 
50 
See Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs "Fighting racism in Europe: should Holocaust 
denial be a criminal offence?" ( 19 March 2007) Press Release www.europaparl.europa.com (accessed 30 
September 2009); BBC News "Push for EU Holocaust denial ban" ( 15 January 2007) BBC News 
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discussion regarding the Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia. The initiation of such framework by the Commission in 2001 was based on a 
series of racist and xenophobic motivated events all over Europe. 51 However, the framework 
had been frozen since 2005 52 and was discussed again in 2006 and 2007. It came to the result 
of criminalising the intentional conduct referring to crimes against humanity in general, but 
not only to holocaust denial. The current framework met the minimal consensus of the EU 
Ministers stating that53 
Publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing 
Crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Articles 6,7, and 8) directed against a group of persons or a 
member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or 
ethnic origin , and 
Crimes defined by the Tribunal of Nuremberg (Article 6 of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal , London Agreement of 1945) directed against a group of persons or a 
member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion , descent or national or 
ethnic origin 
will be punishable in all EU member states. However, it is worth to emphasise that the 
Framework Decision does not cover crimes committed on other grounds, for example by 
totalitarian regimes. 54 Thus, the result of this framework is that it does not criminalise 
Holocaust denial outright, but an imprisonment up to three years is optionally available for 
"denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes." 
http: //news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 30 September 2009). See further Sebastian Weber "Strafbarkeit der 
Holocaustleugnung in der Europiiischen Union" (2008) I ZRP 22 . 
5 1 The European Commission includes one national of each member state and is the executive body of the 
European Union. It is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions and upholding the 
Union's treatises see Treaty Establishing the European Community, 10 November 1997, Official Journal C 
340 (consolidated version Official Journal C 321 E of 29 December 2006), articles 211 et seq. Article 213 
states that it is independent in the performance of their duties . For the proposal of the Commission see 
Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia COM 
(2001) 664 final Official Journal C 75 E http: //eur-lex.europa.eu (accessed 30 September 2009). 
52 See "Racism and holocaust denial debated at EU Parliamentary hearing" (20 Jw1e 2006) www.eu-un .europa.eu 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
53 Council of the European Union "Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia" (19 April 2007) Press 
Release 8665/07 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ (accessed 30 September 2009). 1l1e approach was first 
pending on the lifting of Parliamentary reservations, but the reservations were lifted in 2008 , see Permanent 
Representatives Committee "A item note" (26 November 2008) http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ (accessed 
30 September 2009) and Council of the European Union "290sth meeting of the Council" (27 and 28 
November 2008) Press Release 16325/ 1/08 REV 1 http: //register.consilium.europa.eu/ (accessed 30 
September 2009). 
54 See "Racism and holocaust denial debated at EU Parliamentary hearing", see above n 52 . 
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This approach, as it is not that specific as for example, the German or Austrian 
Holocaust denial law and as it provides for punishment of publicly inciting to violence or 
hatred in general as well55 leads to the approach of broader laws covering the prohibition of 
hate speech and racial incitement. Regarding this more general approach, there exist a number 
of international and national legal instruments referring to "incitement to violence" alongside 
racial vilification. 56 Countries providing such a law therefore, do not specifically criminalise 
Holocaust denial, but prosecute individuals that promote hate speech. 
To assess whether this kind of law can be applied in case of Holocaust denying 
statements and whether Holocaust denying laws are a form of hate speech laws, one has to 
scrutinise the harm rationale and the injury it might cause to the public good. 
B Hate Speech: The Harm Rationale 
As emphasised above, freedom of expression 1s a fundamental right in liberal 
democracies57 and thus, gains a high protection. However, one has to ask whether the same 
can be applied to hate speech as it raises fundamental issues from legal and philosophical 
standpoints. 58 There exist different facets of hate speech. It may find its expression in the form 
of epithets such as "Nigger", public campaigns against ethnic groups or religions or swastikas 
spray painted on a gay man's car. The list of examples seems to be endless. Although quite 
different in their circumstances and appearance, they all have something in common: the 
effect to cause harm. 
Hate speech is intended to injure, degrade, denigrate or ridicule people and by those 
means, to cause psychological and physical harm and discrimination. 59 Before having a closer 
look at the specific effect of harm and its manifestation, it is necessary to point out the targets 
as the concrete effect of harm may depend on the target it affects. One can draw a distinction, 
55 
See paragraph I of the Framework Decision . Compare CoW1cil of the European Union "Framework Decision 
on Raci sm and Xenophobia" ( 19 April 2007) Press Release 8665/07 http: //register.consiliurn .europa.eu/ 
(accessed 30 September 2009). 
56 
See for example Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, Boston , London, 1999) 192. Moreover, see multilateral agreements, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forn1s of Racial Discrimination 1966 and International Convenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
57 See III D. 
58 
See Jean-Frarn;:ois Gaudreault-Des Biens " From Sisyphus ' s Dilemma to Sisyphus's Duty? A Mediation on the 
Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Relation to Hate Crimes and Genocide" (2001) 46 McGill LJ 1117, 1118. 
59 
See ibid ; Human Rights Conunission "Submission to the Government Administration Committee into the 
Inquiry into Hate Speech" (5 May 2005). 
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categorising two groups: first, hate speech that is directed toward particular individuals or the 
targeted group and secondly, the harm which is communicated to society and the public as a 
whole. 
The harm hate speech causes on the individual person or the target group advances feelings of 
prejudice and inferiority of the targeted group.60 The professors Lee Epstein and Thomas 
Walker define hate speech in their highly respected study Constitutional Law for a Changing 
America as61 
Expression based on hatred [that] goes well beyond the standards of appropriateness or good 
taste. It arises from hostile, discriminatory, and prejudicial attitudes toward another person's 
innate characteristics: sex, race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. When directed at a 
member of a targeted group, such expression is demeaning and hurtful. Hate speech tends to 
be devoid of traditional commentary on political issues or on the need for changes in public 
policy. Instead, its central theme is hostility toward individuals belonging to the target group. 
Therefore, people targeted by hate propaganda and hateful messages respond to it 
feeling humiliated and being fearful 62 because physical violence may follow. The 
stigmatisation can lead to a loss of self-abasement and self-worth, psychological injury, such 
as emotional distress63 , intimidation and isolation and as a consequence, to the quitting of a 
job or the leaving of a home. Thus, it is an indirect cause of the hate speech that targets 
underperform in academic circumstances. The harm of hate speech toward particular 
individuals can therefore be summarised as the violation of their rights of personal security, 
personality, dignity and equality. 
Moreover, with regard to the second category of a potential target of hate speech, the 
harm caused to particular individuals or a group may be reflected to the public and thus, 
society might suffer as well. By telling the audience what links the "target" as a group, 
isolating the opponent and destroying the validity of its characteristics, the audience will want 
to distance itself from what it finds abhorrent and that can create a negative impact on the 
60 See Kent Greenawalt Fighting Words (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995) 59. 
61 Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties and Justice (4 
ed, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2001) 271. 
62 See Kathleen Mahoney " Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression" ( 1996) U ILL 
LR 789, 792. 
63 Steven J Heyman Free Speech and Human Dignity, see above n 4, 165; see further Richard Delgado "Words 
that Wow1d: A tort action for racial insults, epithets, and name calling" ( 1982) 17 Harv CR-CL LR 133, 138. 
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target.64 Thus, hate speech undermines fundamental democratic values, such as the societal 
order and the responsibility not to use your freedom to infringe another's. However, the right 
to be recognised as a person is the most fundamental right that an individual has. It is a right 
that lies at the basis of all their other rights and that constitutes a functioning society and 
political community. 65 
Moreover, hate speech can lead to an atmosphere of discrimination and potential 
violence and increases the risk of hate crimes, xenophobia and genocide.
66 The latter effect is 
likely to result from vio Jenee committed by other persons incited by "vilifiers" to assault the 
victims of racial vilification. The former aspect, the potential violence, might not only result 
from "vilifiers" or incited people, but also from the reaction by the victims of group 
vilification. This aspect with its different forms of violence degrades the standards of 
everyday life and civility. It undermines social peace and harmony, and thus, the entire 
society as a result. 67 
Another aspect one has to consider is the risk of tensions between speakers and a third 
group of people. As set out under the harm of increasing violence, initially non-involved 
persons might be incited and continue with hate propaganda or react with violence. Thus, hate 
speech may affect not just those whom are targeted. The same applies to people who disagree 
with the speaker and align themselves with the target. Moreover, individuals or a whole group 
may be the subject of an attack not because they are for example homosexual and therefore, 
target to an attack against homosexuals, but merely because they are thought to be. 68 Thus, 
hate speech can affect anyone. 
As could be shown, hate speech might cause harm. Every instance of genocide came 
on the heels of a wave of hate speech, depicting the victims in belittling terms. 69 Therefore, 
64 
Office offilm and Literature Classification "Submission Inquiry into Hate Speech" (29 October 2004) 6 
www.censorship.govt.nz (accessed 30 September 2009). 
65 See Steven J Heyman , see above n 4, 171. 
66 
Juliet Moses, see above n 12, 195; Jean-Franyois Gaudreault-DesBiens, see above n 58, 1119. See Michael 
Rosenfeld "Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A comparative Analysis" (2003) 24 Cardozo LR 
1523, 1525 who distinguishes between general hate speech laws that are concerned with hatred or vilification 
towards certain groups and speech that incites violence. 
67 See Wojciech Sadurski, see above n 56, 195. 
68 See Human Rights Commission, above n 59, 5. 
69 
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic "Four Observations about Hate Speech" (2009) 44 Wake Forest Law 
Review 353, 363 . 
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speech has to be taken seriously; it forms the social world that makes harm possible. As 
Matsuda points out70 
There is no genocide without supporting propaganda. There is no rape without misogyny; 
there is no gay bashing without homophobia . There is no lynching without the 'N' word. This 
is not a poem . I mean it as a statement of fact. Without the language that says " this is not a 
person", it is typically not possible for hw11an beings to harm other human beings. 
C Holocaust Denial as Hate Speech: Does it cause similar Harm? 
To assess whether Holocaust denial is a form of hate speech one has to analyse how 
the harm rationale is reflected in Holocaust denying statements in relation to its categories of 
targets. There are some arguments supporting the theory that explicit Holocaust denial 1s a 
form of hate speech affecting an individual target or a group. 
At first , by denying that the Holocaust has happened, institutions like the IHR or 
persons like Irving deny survivors their history. However, "to deny a people their history is to 
deny them the most essential element of their group existence. It is always a precursor to the 
subordination, diminishment, and ultimately the destruction of a people."71 One might not 
even surmise the harm and hurtfulness of someone who suffered and survived the Holocaust 
listening to statements that "it never happened". Moreover, Holocaust denying statements do 
not only cause harm regarding the survivors, but carry the indictment of denigrating the 
memory of those who suffered incarceration in the Nazi concentration camps, thus 
constituting for those affected and their families a kind of desecration as well. 72 
This harm is reflected in a the German case Beleidigungs.fahigkeit eines erst nach 
1945 geborenen Juden the court stated that73 
TI1e very historical fact that hwnans were segregated according to their origin under the so-called 
Nuremberg laws, and were robbed of their individuality with a view to their extem1ination, gives 
70 Mari J Matsuda "Hate Speech: What Price Tolerance" (13 March 2003) Panel Discussion Arlin M Adams 
Center for Law and Society at usquehanna University www.susqu.edu/documents/hate.pdf (accessed I 
October 2009). 
71 Arthur Berney in Boston College Law School " Debate: Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial" (1987) 8 
Cardozo LR 559, 572. 
72 See Peter R Teachout, above n 16,670. 
73 Beleidigungsflihigkeil eine erst nach l 945 geborenen Ju den [ 1979] 75 BGHZ 160 (DE) (FCJ), translated by 
Eric Stein "History against free speech: The German law against the 'Auschwitz '- and other 'lies'" (1986) 85 
Michigan Law Review, 277, 303. 
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the Jews living in the Federal Republic a special personal relationship with their fellow citizens; 
in this relationship the past is present even today. They are entitled, as a component of their 
personal self-image, to be viewed as a part of a group, singled out by fate, to which all others owe 
a particular moral responsibility, and that is an aspect of their honor. The respect of this self-
image constitutes for every one of them one of the guarantees against a repetition of 
discrin1ination and a basis for their life in the Federal Republic. 
Moreover, this leads to the thereto linked harm of fear and intimidation of Jewish 
people as Holocaust denial is a current fo1m of the class is anti-Semitism doctrine of the evil, 
manipulative and threatening world Jewish conspiracy. 74 What is on the surface a denial of 
the reality of genocide is, at its core, an appeal to genocidal hatred. 75 Therefore, it has an 
impact upon the feelings of the Jews and can cause anger and intimidation. Holocaust deniers, 
such as David Irving, are for example often connected with right-wing groups in Europe, 
giving speeches in front of them. 76 Although neo-Nazism has its own nuances, its supporters 
may also espouse the denial of the Holocaust. Moreover, it is Holocaust deniers and neo-
Nazis common goal to revive or resurge Nazism or Nazi ideological principles. 77 Thus, 
Holocaust deniers use neo- azis as a mass-audience to plant seeds of questioning and doubt 
about the Holocaust and to make the world safe for anti-Semitism again. 78 It is without any 
question, that marches, speeches and any kind of neo-Nazim or anti-Semitism in the form of 
Holocaust denial causes fear and intimidation to the targeted group. 
The aspect of anti-Semitism is reflected in the second target, the entire society 
suffering from hate speech, as well. Holocaust denying statements - as seen above in relation 
to the connection between neo-Nazis and Holocaust deniers - engender anti-Semitism in 
others. This leads to discrimination and the destruction of the order in which Jewish people 
have the same right of recognition. Thus, the public good and peace, reflected in a functioning 
societal order of a democracy is harmed. In the case against Holocaust denier Zundel (R v 
Zundel) the Appeal Court found that "[t]his appeal concerns the wilful publication of deliberate, 
injurious lies and the legislation which seeks to combat the serious harm to society as a whole 
74 
See Anti-Defamation League "Introduction: Denial as Anti-Semitism" www.adl.org/Holocaust/theory 
(accessed I October 2009). 
75 Ibid. 
76 
The Nizkor Project " David Irving, Holocaust denial , and hi connections to right-wing extremists and Neo-
National Socialism (neo-Nazism) in Gennany www.nizkor.org (accessed 3 October 2009). 
77 
See Ox ford English Dictionary "neo-Nazism" http ://dictionary.oed .com .helicon .vuw.ac .nz (accessed 3 
October 2009); Holocaust Denial on Trial , see above n 30 . 
78 See Anti-Defamation League, above n 74. 
21 
caused by these calculated and deceitful falsehoods."79 Moreover, the judgment refers to another 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, R v Keegstra80 , in which a school teacher had taught 
his pupils that Jews have various evil qualities and thus he made :frequent anti-Semitic 
statements. Although this case was not directly concerned with a Holocaust denying statement, it 
becomes applicable for this analysis by being quoted in the decision against the Holocaust denier 
Zundel. In Keegstra the court clearly recognised 81 
the invidious and severely ham1ful effects of hate propaganda upon target group members and 
upon society as a whole. It was found that members of such groups, not unexpectedly, respond to 
the hwniliation and degradation of such "expression" by being fearful and withdrawing from full 
participation in society. Society as a whole suffers because such "expression" has the effect of 
undermining the core values of freedom and democracy ... [thus] Holocaust denial has pernicious 
effects upon Canadians who suffered, fought and died as a result of the Nazi's campaign of racial 
bigotry and upon Canadian society as a whole. 
This shows that Holocaust denying statements can target the same victims, an 
individual person or a targeted group as well as the whole society of a nation than hate 
speech. Problems that arise with regard to hate speech can have to be considered under the 
more specific Holocaust denial statement, too. Thus, one can argue, that Holocaust denial is a 
special form of hate speech. However, this does not mean, that Holocaust denial may be 
punishable in every country which has hate speech laws on their books. It might be the case 
that the actual case might not meet the requirements of the specific criteria of a hate speech 
law. A Holocaust denying statement may have its own nuances, too - whether it is "just" 
denying or used in a judgmental context and thus, lead to different legal consequences. 
Moreover, one can raise the issue - like Teachout - that there is a distinction whether 
to say a state may legitimately censor hate speech because of the hate element or to censor 
same speech because the views expressed fail to confonn to some state-established, orthodox 
version of history. 82 This is a good point and part of the research question. However, the 
statement is not linked to the fact whether a Holocaust denying statement can be regarded as a 
form of hate speech or not. 83 One can argue against the classification of a Holocaust denial 
statement as a form of hate speech, that the law sometimes provides different prov1s1ons, 
79 R v Zundel [ 1992] 2 SCR 731 (SCC). 
80 R v Keegstra [ 1990] 3 SCR 697 (SCC) . 
81 Quoted in R v Zundel, above n 79. 
82 Peter R Teachout, see above n 16. 
83 See Christopher Bishop "Denying the undeniable: Holocaust denial , the criminal law, and free speech" (LLB 
(Hons) Research paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) 24 25. 
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covering both aspects and therefore, draws a distinction. An example could be the above 
mentioned European Framework which consists of sub-paragraphs, pointing out hate speech 
in general in the first one and focussing of the denial of genocide in a second one. 84 Another 
example is the German Criminal Code which contains hate speech laws as well as prohibiting 
Holocaust denial specifically. 85 However, the coexistence of hate speech and Holocaust denial 
law in specific does not lead to the conclusion that both fom1s have to be distinguished. As 
could be shown Holocaust denial statements contain the same harm rationale than "general" 
hate speech does. Therefore, it qualifies as hate speech. Another perspective is that the 
coexistence of laws wants to avoid loopholes in relation to the single criteria of hate speech 
law. Thus, one has to assess whether hate speech laws - being more general or specific in 
form of a Holocaust denial law - is a justified restriction of freedom of expression. 
D The Importance of Freedom of Expression 
Speech is the vehicle by which humans express and exchange their thoughts, beliefs, 
and opinions. Every thought, belief, opinion and statement and word contains power and thus, 
in tum causes a certain effect on its recipient. "Written constitutions and Bill of Rights 
invariably protect freedom of speech as one of the fundamental liberties guaranteed against 
state suppression or regulation."86 Even in countries in which freedom of expression does not 
gain constitutional status, it is protected by common law, culturally and politically. Especially 
European countries, however, protect other important values, such as human dignity and 
personal honour as well, and hence, have to balance freedom of expression against these other 
highly valued rights. On the contrary, the American form of freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by the First Amendment, is absolute and trumps all other values. Despite this 
difference, however, freedom of expression is a basic value in all western countries. Thus, one 
has to ask why we should protect free speech. What are its underlying rationales? 
E The Ratiollales behind Freedom of Expression 
There are three main rationales mentioned in scholarship and cases justifying freedom 
of expression. These are briefly outlined below. 
84 Framework Decision, above n 53 . 
85 Gemian Criminal Code, s 130 with all its subparagraphs. 
86 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) I. 
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1 The "marketplace of ideas" 
Freedom of expression is connected to the development of democracies, starting m 
ancient Greece. "The agora and later in Rome the forum romanum were the original and 
literal 'marketplace of ideas'."87 This premise was developed through the years and 
subsequently transformed into the American First Amendment, where it fmds its strongest 
form. In the Anglo-American environment John Milton and John Stuart Mill are well-
respected for their arguments and theories they pushed forward pro freedom of expression, the 
importance of an open debate to discover the truth. Milton declared88 
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all 
liberties ... Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free 
and open encounter. 
Mill argues even stronger for the publishing not just of truth, but to allow false statements as 
well. 89 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human 
race ... those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold It. If the opinion is 
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose 
the clear perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by the collision with error. 
Later on, Justice Holmes put these ideas into the often-cited words: "The best test of truth is 
the power of though to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."90 In other words, 
the scholars and practitioners argue for freedom of expression without censorship as free 
speech will eliminate weak and wrong opinions. Thus, free speech is postulated for the 
marketplace to operate and to fmd truth. 
2 Freedom of expression as promoter for self-development and -fulfilment 
Another main rationale underlying freedom of expression is its necessity for personal 
self-fulfilment and - development. It is the natural right's premise that mental self-fulfilment 
87 Stephen J Roth "The Laws of Six Countries: An Analytical Comparison" in Louis Greenspan and Cyril Levitt 
(eds) Under the Shadows of Weimar - Democracy, Law, and Racial lncitemenl in Six Countries (Praeger, 
Westport, Conneticut, London, 1993) 180. 
88 John Milton "Aeropagitica : A Speech fort he Liberty of Unlicensed Printing" to the Parliament of England in 
1644 in John Milton Prose Wrilings (Everyman 's Library, JM Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1958) 145. 
89 John Stuart Mill "On Liberty'' in Three Essays (OUP, first published as a World's Classics paperback, 1991) 
14, 21. 
90 Abrams v United States ( 1919) 250 US 616, 630, Holmes J dissenting. 
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1s a pnmary good.91 By having free expressions one can create a critical reasonmg. 
"Restrictions on what we are allowed to say and write ... to hear and read, inhibit our 
personality and its growth."92 Quoting Sartre "self-expression is an expression of choosing 
ourselves"93 , a human voicing of our distinctive identity.
94 Speech distinguishes human beings 
from animals. Thus, to be free in the form and content of speech is a manifestation of 
autonomy. Speech - whether written or spoken - is a direct way of communication. By using 
speech, an individual expresses its autonomy, showing his thoughts and beliefs to others. 
Speech does, moreover, include a feedback of those who are confronted with one's thoughts 
and opinions. Hence, freedom of speech might create a self-regulation and therefore, benefit 
society. 
3 Participation in a democracy 
Moreover, it is essential to have free speech in order to debate, contribute to and to 
paiiicipate in the democratic process. This political ai·gument is often urged in connection 
with the theory of Alexander Meiklejohn and his followers. In Meiklejohn's view it is the 
primary purpose of free speech to protect the right of all citizens to understand and discuss 
political issues in order to participate effectively in the working of democracy. 
95 Freedom of 
expression may affect the citizens' choices regarding their decision making and voting. It was 
held in R v Kopy to that "[a] democracy cannot exist without the freedom to express new ideas 
and to put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions."
96 Some 
commentators stress the fact that the argument only works if the democratic ideal of equal 
participation in the process of government stands above majority rule. 
This rationale can be linked to a "negative" theory of free speech protection, stating 
that there are strong arguments to be suspicious of governments and their fallibility. Referring 
to governments and their decisions, it has a political impact and thus, can influence the 
participation of citizens in the democratic process. However, it is more an argument pointing 
out the negative aspects of regulation, rather than highlighting the good of free speech. 
9 1 See T Scanlon "Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression" ( 1979) 40 U Pittsburg LR 519. 
92 Eric Barendt, above n 86, 13 . 
93 J Sartre Being and Nothingless (Philosophical Library, New York, 1956) 598 . 
94 See Stefan Braun Democracy of Balance Freedom of Expression and !fate Propaganda Law in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2004) 36. 
95 See Eric Barendt, above n 86, 18 referring to Alexander Meiklejohn Free Speech and ist Relation to Self-
G01•ernment (Harper, New York, 1948) and ibid "1l1e First Amendment is an Absolute" [ 1961] Supreme 
Court Review 245 . 
96 R v Kopy to ( 1987) 4 7 DLR 213 , 226 (CoA), Cory J. 
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Frederick Schauer mainly emphasises the importance of this argument as a justification for 
the protection of freedom of expression. 97 
Freedom of speech is based on large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make 
the necessary di stinctions, a distrust of governmental detem1inations of truth and falsity, an 
appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper distrust of 
government power in a more general sense. 
This idea pushes forward the idea of freedom of expression of a control mechanism and as a 
medium to balance decisions made by governments. 
F A Critique of the Rationales behind Freedom of Expression 
However, the above mentioned rationales behind freedom of expression have been 
criticised by many commentators and scholars. 
The rationale of discovering truth assumes that the expression of a true statement is the 
highest premise for a society. This perception treats truth as being absolute and objective and 
thus, is one-dimensional. The view presupposes that one can prove and verify the facts 
underlying speech with regard to self-evident truths. 98 However, there is the sort of opinion 
that is hardly amenable to the truth analysis, in particular those statements which come close 
to the "pure opinion". 99 In such cases, it might be difficult to assess the truthfulness and to 
justify truth. Moreover, societies might have different understandings of what is true or not. 
This stresses the fact that truth is not absolute, but relative. 
The argument is linked with a criticism to Mill's argument that the utility of an 
opinion cannot be separated from its truth as one can argue that a public and free debate of a 
restriction of a certain kind of speech does not damage society. This emphasises that the 
establishment of truth is not necessary impossible when banning a publication or a certain 
kind of speech. To argue against this by saying that it is overall misguided to restrict and 
suppress a certain kind of speech because this drives unpleasant ideas underground and that 
97 Frederick Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enq11i1y (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982) 86. 
98 See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott "The 1-Iatefi.tlness of Protected Speech : A Comparison of the American and 
European Approaches" ( I 999) 7 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 305, 335 . 
99 See Wojciech Sadurski , above n 56, I 0. 
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they may surface later in a more dangerous form, departs from the argument of truth. '
00 It 
might be an argument against the restriction of speech in general, but does not relate to the 
interests of truth. 
Moreover, the attempt to find truth by a free marketplace of ideas does not consider 
the differences and variety of education and knowledge among the citizens who participate in 
the process. The idea of a free market for speech assumes that all individuals have the same 
qualifications, options and access to the market. However, some voices, those with greater 
access to the media to disseminate their opinion, might "dominate, shout down, or silence 
weaker but possibly truer voices."
101 It is highly questionable whether such inequality in 
positions to find truth is an appropriate way to discover truth. Mill's theory however, is based 
on equality and the fact that "middle class, educated audience whose members would be able 
to make up their own minds" '
02, but this theoretical construct does not reflect reality. This 
leads to argument that a free marketplace of ideas does not necessarily lead to the reception of 
truth, but to undesirable results. "Indeed, some historical experience suggests the contrary; the 
azis came to power in Germany in 1933, although there had been (relatively) free political 
discourse under the Weimar Republic during the 1920s."
103 
A further concern relating to the theory of discover truth, is the question whether the 
model of a free marketplace of ideas relates to opinion as well as to wrong facts. Arguments 
that "truth and falsehood may grapple" are more relating to an opinion than to a false fact. 
One can argue that false statements do not contribute to the process of discovering the truth 
and thus, they can be excluded from the freedom of expression. However, one can argue that 
falsity is necessary for the confirmation of the truth.
104 This view does not consider the appeal 
of false statements. False statements may have sufficient amplifying volume, in propaganda 
and mass media, they can often win the battle
105 or in the words of the Williams Committee 
report 106 
100 See Eric Barendt, above n 86, 9. 
101 See Sionaidh Douglass-Scott, see above n 98, 336. 
102 
Quoted in Sionaidh Douglass-Scott, above n 98, 336. Alan Regel "Hate Propaganda: A Reason to Limit 
Freedom of Expression" (1984) 49 Sask Law Rev 303 , 307 moreover, points out that Mill assumes the 
audience will recognize the truth when confronted with it, whereas in fact humans are prone to persuasion by 
arguments that are not sound. 
103 See Eric Barendt, above n 86, 9. 
104 
See Karl Popper The Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge and Kegan Paul , London, 1962) 123-124. 
105 See Wojciech Sadurski, above n 56, l 2. 
106 
Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship "Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship" 
( 1979) 55. 1l1e marketplace of ideas rationale is essentially an adaptation of Adam Smith ' s economic 
philosophy to law, in that faith is placed in the market to reach the correct conclusion provided that the 
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Against the principle that truth is strong and (given the chance) will prevail, must be set 
Gresham's Law, that bad money drives out good, which has some application in matters of 
culture and which predicts that it will not necessarily be the most interesting ideas or the most 
valuable works of art that survive in competition . 
This does not mean that a state has to restrict freedom of expression and has to 
suppress all wrong facts, which has to be discussed in the individual case. However, the issues 
show the lack of the principle of the marketplace of ideas to discover the truth. Drawing a 
comparison to economic marketplaces, one can however doubt, that a free and unrestricted 
market leads to the best results and truth, as reality shows that democracies need regulations 
and restriction of a their marketplace to eliminate an unwanted balance of power. 
In relation to the rational of self-fulfilment and -development it is without any doubt 
that freedom of expression is important for a person's self-fulfilment. However, one has to see 
that freedom of expression is not the only freedom and right that promotes the development of 
a personality. As seen above, it can be argued that the exercise of freedom of speech infringes 
human dignity or the rights of another person affected by the speech to be treated with equal 
respect and concern. 107 This argument is linked to the fact that individuals are part of a 
community and thus, can just exercise their freedoms within the boundaries of a community. 
"Such criticism proceeds from the Aristotelian thesis that humans are incomplete as 
individuals because they can develop and exercise distinctively human capacities only 
through participation in group life." 10
8 
Besides the rationale of self-fulfilment the theory of freedom of expression as an 
engine-room for democracy shows its lacks as well. It has been questioned as a justification 
for free speech in cases of non-political speech as its proponents argue for it in relation for a 
working democracy. However, this leads to the difficult questions of what can be considered 
as political speech and whether it is always possible to identify what is political. The fact that 
for example Meiklejohn has admitted that political issues can derive from philosophy, 
market is allowed to function uninhibited by external restriction s, see Petra Butler and Andrew Butler The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentmy (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 307 . 
107 Compare Eric Barendt, above n 86, 15. 
108 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, see above n 98, 338 . 
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literature and art 1°9 , makes it even more difficult to draw clear boundaries of political speech. 
As Sadurski puts it that
110 
it seems that there is some incongruency between the rationale and the scope of the protection: 
... The first horn of the dilenmrn captures the sense of unease that many of us have about 
elevating politics to the apex of human activity; such an elevation is aid to smack of elitism, 
and of neglect for other realms of human endeavour. .. The second horn of the dilenm1a ... can 
only be remedied by watering down the sense of " the political" to a point at which virtually 
any worthy activity ... will in turn find its remote articulation in the voting decision. 
G Arguments for and against Legislative Intervention regarding Hate Speech and 
Holocaust Denial 
Having analysed the rationales of harm, freedom of expression and the criticism which 
can be pushed forward in relation to the rationales of freedom of expression, one has to apply 
the arguments to the restriction of hate speech, in particular to Holocaust denying statements. 
As history and present have shown, and, shows, the theory of a free marketplace of 
ideas to discover the truth, seems to fail to a certain degree regarding hate speech and 
especially, in its form of Holocaust denial. As the introductory statement by Lipstadt shows, 
deniers should be fought with truth. By doing so Lipstadt refers to the truth-rationale 
underlying freedom of expression. It is without any doubt, that education about the past and 
truth gain high importance and that is the right way to fight Holocaust deniers by convicting 
them with words. However, the mentioned convictions in the past months and the increased 
neo- azism movements show the failure of "discovering the truth". Recently, Irving has 
started a "speech - tour" within the United States
111
, disseminating his denying statements. 
Actions like that show that societies are not able to flatten this kind of thinking. Thus, it seems 
that the law is tasked to keep the truth, to regulate the free marketplace of ideas, as 
testimonies of World War II are dying, but the problem of Holocaust denial remains a hot 
issue. As pointed out in the Cohen-Report "given the right circumstances, human beings can 
be persuaded to believe almost anything. Some individuals, of course, are more susceptible 
than others."
112 This statement can be stressed by the fact that Holocaust deniers - or 
109 See "The First Amendment Is an Absolute", above n 95, 256. 
110 Wojciech Sadurski, above n 56, 22. 
111 See http://www.focal.org/speaks/index .html (accessed 10 November 2009). 
112 Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada "Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in 
Canada" (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966) 6. 
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revisionists - use manipulative language as pointed out above. Reading their publications with 
respect to the research of the paper, has revealed that one has to read critically to judge the 
true content of these documents. Thus Teachout referring to Brickel questions rightly
113 
Does constitutional commitment of freedom of expression mean, as Holmes argues, that we 
have to sit idly by while the marketplace of ideas determines which ideas prevail and which 
do not, and accept whatever ideas in the long run come to be accepted by a dominant majority, 
no matter how brutal and savage and destructive those ideas may be? 
Supporters of an umestricted freedom of expression, argue that a law restricting 
speech might even alert the targeted group. This might be true to a certain degree. However, 
one has to assess the outcome of a law restricting speech not just in consideration to the 
targeted group, but to the whole society which might suffer from it. Moreover, a legislative 
intervention - although alerting the problem of Holocaust denial - might protect and value the 
human dignity and rights of victims of hate speech and in particular, Jews. This argument 
considers the harm caused by hate speech; the discrimination, hate and intolerance. The right 
to freedom of expression cannot be seen to trump all other values and rights, such as 
recognition and human dignity. 114 This is at least true for the German Basic Law and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights which both consider a limitation of freedom of expression due to 
certain criteria and values. It is more than questionable why a democracy should allow hate 
speech in form of Holocaust denial as it is its supporters' goal to destroy democratic rationales 
and to revive National-Socialism thought and structures. This would disavow the rationales of 
a democratic state and thus, the rationale of freedom of expression entirely. 
These arguments are often confronted with statements that the restriction of speech 
leads to a chilling effect and a "slippery slope" towards censorship. However, this view 
misses the point that there might arise another "slippery slope" that leads into a marketplace 
of ideas where bad ideas prosper and good ideas vanish." 115 Moreover, to allow limitations to 
the freedom of expression does not make a point regarding the extent of restriction and 
whether it is more useful to restrict the scope of protection than to create exceptions to a broad 
protection. 11 6 As Bickel concluded "Where nothing is unspeakable, nothing is undoable."
11 7 
113 Peter R Teachout, above n 16, 670. 
114 See Steven J Heyman, above n 4, 170. 
115 Irwin Cotler " Holocaust Denial , Equality and Harm: Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance in a Liberal 
Democracy'' in Raphael Cohen-Almagor (ed) Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: Essays in 
Honor and Memo1y of Yit::.hak Rabin (Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, 2000) 151 , 169. 
116 See for example under IV C 3 c). 
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Words may be as hurtful as a punch. One carefully has to assess to which degree speech and 
the denying of the Holocaust should be prohibited and thus, which of the following presented 
legal responses is preferable. However, one can conclude in general that freedom of 
expression is not an absolute principle. 
IV THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL 
A Laws against Holocaust Denial - au overview 
The German Criminal Code provides far-reaching provisions regarding the incitement 
of people, as well as Holocaust denial. While hate speech in form of Holocaust denial may be 
punishable under certain circumstances as insult (section 185 GCC), section 130 GCC and its 
several sub-paragraphs contain the punishment of hate speech, and different kinds of the 
Auschwitz Deception, the most explicit form of Holocaust denial. This paper focuses on the 
analysis of problems concerning the "simple Auschwitz Deception" provided under section 
130 (3) GCC. 11 8 
B The "simple" Auschwitz Deception 
The "simple" Auschwitz Deception 1s a special form of Holocaust denial. It is 
understood as the denial of the National Socialist genocide of the Jews out of hand, but covers 
the dismissal of one or more of the Holocaust - essentials 119 as well. 120 
1 Reasons for the implementation of the "simple" Auschwitz Deception 
The "simple" Auschwitz Deception is covered by section 130 (3) of the German 
Criminal Code smce 1994, when the Criminal Fighting Law (Verbrechens-
bekampfungsgesetz) amended the Criminal Code. Although the "simple" Auschwitz 
Deception had already been indictable as an insult under section 185 GCC there existed 
several reasons to amend the law. 
11 7 
Alexander M Bickel "Domesticated Civil Disobedience: The First Amendment, from Sullivan to the 
Pentagon Papers" in The Morality of Consent (Yale University Press, New Haven , 1975) 72-73. 
118 
See Juliane Wetzel "The Judicial Treatment of Incitement against Ethnic Groups and of the Denial of 
National Socialist Mass Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany" in Louis Greenspan and Cyril Levitt 
(eds), see above n 87, 83-106. 
11 9 
Such as the existence of a plan to kill the Jews; the existence of poison gas chambers etc. 
120 
See Joachim Neander "Mit dem Strafrecht gegen die ' Auschwitz-Li.ige': Ein halbes Jahrhundert * 130 
Stra fgesetzbuch 'Volksverhetzung"' (2006) see http://aps.su1b. uni-saarland.de/theologie.gesch ich te (accessed 
10 ovember 2009). 
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On the one hand, German legislature wanted to create a higher range of sentences than 
provided under the former law of section 185 GCC. Beyond that reason, the applicability of 
section 185 was bound by a complaint which required a personal concernment. Therefore, it 
has been discussed controversially by the literature and courts
12 1 whether the denial of the 
Holocaust in the form of the Auschwitz Deception was covered by section 185 GCC. The 
Federal Constitutional Court explicitly left this question unanswered as well. 
122 Consensus 
just existed concerning the classification of the "aggravated" Auschwitz Deception under 
sections 185, 194 GCC as a collective insult. 12
3 First amendments to this fragmentary 
legislation led to the omission of the complaint-requirement for the persecutees of the 
National Socialist regime. 
However, the determining cause for the implementation of the "simple" Auschwitz 
Deception by section 130 (3) GCC was the Deckert- judgment by the Federal Court of 
Justice. 124 The District Court in Mannheim had convicted Deckert, the former local chairman 
of the right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany under the former section 130 and 
under section 185 GCC, but the Federal Court of Justice invalidated the judgment and 
remanded the case to the District Court.
125 The Federal Court found that Deckert's speech, in 
which he talked about the "gas chamber lie" did not fulfil the requirements of the above 
mentioned sections as both of the provisions just covered the "aggravated" Auschwitz 
Deception at that time. The judgment caused a storm of protest and led to the introduction of 
an appropriate amendment bill to the German Parliament one month after the Deckert-
judgment, which was implemented into the current law in October 1994. 
12 1 Strajbarkeit der Leugnung des Massenmordes an Juden (Holocaust) [ 1994] 40 BGHSt 97, 105 (DE) (FCJ); 
Gunter Bertram "Entrii.stungsstii.rme im Medienzeitalter - der BGH und die ' Auschwitzluge'" ( 1994) 31 NJW 
2002. 
122 Strafrecht/iche Bewertung der Leugnung der Judenvernichtung [ 1994) 90 BVerfGE 241, 252 (DE) (FCC). 
123 Theodor Lenckner in AdolfSchi:inke and Horst Schroder (eds) Strafgesetzbuc/1 Kommentar (27 ed, CH Beck, 
Munich, 2006) section 185 para 5 Criminal Code see http://beck-online.beck.de/ (accessed 10 November 
2009). 
124 Andreas Stegbauer " Der Straftatbestand gegen die Auschwitzleugnung eine Zwischenbilanz" (2000) 6 
NStZ 282; Friedrich Kubler " Rassenhetze und Meinungsfreiheit Grenziiberschreitende Aspekte eines 
Grw1drechtskontliktes" (2000) 125 AoeR 109, 114; Klaus Miebach and Jurgen Schafer in Wolfgang Joecks 
and Klaus Miebach Miinchener Kommentar wm Strc!fgeset:::buch Band 2/2 (CH Beck, Mw1ich , 2005) section 
130 para 12 Criminal Code see http://beck-online.beck.de/ (accessed 10 November 2009). 
125 Strajbarkeit der Auschwitzliige [ I 993) 31 BGIISt 226 (DE) (FCJ); Strajbarkeit der Leugnung des 
Massenmordes an Juden (Ho/ocaust),above n 121 . 
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2 Section 130 (3) of the German Criminal Code 
Before scrutinising the conflict between section 130 (3) GCC and freedom of 
expression one has to analyse the requirements of the penal law provision. 
(a) Legally protected good 
There is still controversy about the legally protected good under section 130 (3) GCC. 
With relation to the German Federal Ministry of Justice the legally protected good ought to be 
the general and public interest, "not to poison the political climate" 126. A minority opinion 
understands the post-mortem right to respect the killed Jews as victims of misconduct to their 
human dignity as the legally protected good under section 130 (3). 127 However, the majority 
disagrees with this opinion emphasizing the distinction between "approval, denial and 
downplaying" in section 130 (3) as the denial and downplaying do not mean an assault of the 
human dignity. Therefore, they consider the public peace as the good legally protected by 
section 130 (3) GCC. 128 
(b) Statement of facts 
At first , section 130 (3) requires the approval, denial or downplaying of an act 
committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind indicated in section 6 (1) of the 
Code of International Criminal Law (Volkerstrafgesetzbuch). The Auschwitz Deception is 
covered by the alternative "denial", which is the contestation or negation of the historical facts 
which are covered by section 6 (1) of the Code of International Criminal Law. 129 The denial 
does not have to be made expressively; it might arise from the context as well, such as the 
term "myth of Auschwitz". 130 Moreover, the denial has to be made publicly or in a meeting, in 
a manner capable of disturbing the public peace. This means that the denial has to be made 
e.g. in a congress and not in a house, where it is "just" heard by three or four individuals. 
Furthermore, a statement, such as the Auschwitz Deception is covered by the provision when 
126 
Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger in Stenographi sche Berichte BT-12 ( l 994), 19671 ; similar 
Vo!ksverhet::ung durch Verleidigerhande!n I [2000] 46 BGHSt 36, 40 (DE) (FCJ) ; Tatjana Hi::imle 
"Yerbreitung der Auschwitzli.ige im Internet" (2001) 6 NStZ 309, 310. 
127 S ee Andreas Stegbauer, above n 124, 283 . 
128 
Herbert Tri::indle and Thomas Fischer Strafgeselzbuch (51 ed, CH Beck, Munich , 2003) section 130 para 23 
Criminal Code; Theodor Lenckner and Detlev Stemberg-Lieben in AdolfSchi::inke and Horst Schroder (eds), 
above n 125, section 130 para 2 Criminal Code. 
129 
Win fried Brugger, above n 4, 396; Peter Rackow in Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed) Beck 'scher Online 
Kommentar Strafrecht (9 ed , CH Beck, Munich , 2009) section 130 para 1 Criminal Code see http://beck-
online.beck.de/ (accessed I O November 2009). 
130 See Andreas Stegbauer, above n 124, 283. 
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131 The Federal Justice Court has found that these statements, 
made publicly or in a meeting usually disturb the public peace. Therefore, the last fact does 
not require a high verification. 
C The Prohibition of the Auschwitz Deception and Freedom of Expression 
As section 130 (3) GCC prohibits the denial of the Holocaust, one can argue that this 
means it is a limitation of the freedom of expression which is guaranteed in article 5 (1) of the 
German Basic Law. Therefore, one has to ask whether the legal prohibition is within the 
scope of the valid limitations provided under article 5 (2). 
1 The Scope of Protection of Freedom of Expression 
Article 5 of the German Basic Law guarantees freedom of expression. It states, that 
"every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, 
writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible 
sources". Although the law uses the term "opinion" one has to ask what is understood by the 
term. Over the years the Federal Constitutional Court of Justice has defined the scope of 
protection of article 5. 
First of all, it protects every kind of opinion, which is characterised by the element of 
statement, comment and evaluation. 132 The underlying understanding which was given to the 
tenn "opinion" by the Federal Constitutional Court means "that every opinion is characterised 
by the subjective relationship of an individual person to the substance of his or her 
statement" 133 This subjective relationship makes it impossible to decide whether the statement 
is true or not. It does not matter whether the statement is justified or gratuitous, whether it is 
rational, emotional, valuable or not, dangerous or harmless. The expression of an opinion does 
not lose its protection by its severe or injuring tone. 
134 
131 Peter Rackow in Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed), above n 129, section 130 para I Criminal Code; 
Vo/ksverhetzung - Leugnen des Holocaust durch Verteidigerhande/11 (2002) 47 BGHSt 278 (DE) (FCJ). 
132 See Wahlkampf[l 982] 6 I BVerfGE I, 8 (OE) (FCC). See Thomas Wandres Die Strajbarkeit des Auschwitz-
Leugnens (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2000) 277 - 285. 
133 Brokdo,f [1985] 69 BVerfGE 315, 344 (DE) (FCC). 
134 Strafrecht/iche Bell'ertung der Leugnung der Judenvernichtung, above n 122, 247; Win fried Brugger, above 
n 4, 376; Franz Schemmer in Volker Epping and Christian llillgruber Beck 'scher Online Kommentar 
Grundgesetz (3 ed, C H Beck, Munich, 2009) article 5 para 4 Basic Law see http: //beck-online.beck.de/ 
(accessed I O November 2 009). 
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However, the Federal Constitutional Court has found that the protection of article 5 
goes beyond its wording and covers the assertion of facts under certain circumstances as well. 
This is justified by the Court, as facts can contribute to the forming of an opinion. 
evertheless, there is an exception to this broad understanding of the scope of protection of 
article 5 of the Basic Law. As wrong assertions of facts cannot contribute to the process of the 
forming of an opinion, the protection of the fundamental right of freedom of expression is not 
guaranteed for these cases. The protection of wrong facts would jeopardize the process of 
communication which is the heart of freedom of expression. 135 This exception applies to pure 
and isolated assertions of facts , but not the mixture of assertions of facts and opinions as the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Justice has found that statements, which link a subjective 
comment with a fact are protected under article 5. This is justified by an effective protection 
of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. 136 However, the courts have to prove at 
first whether one can separate the wrong fact from the judgmental statement to reach a 
differentiated result. Just in cases where a distinction is not possible one has to treat the whole 
statement as a unit which is protected under article 5 of the German Basic Law. 137 
2 Havv to apply the Jurisdiction to Holocaust denying statements 
Having analysed the scope of protection one has to apply the jurisdiction to Holocaust 
denying statements, in particular to the "simple" Auschwitz Deception. With regard to the 
above mentioned, one can pinpoint that the pure and isolated statement, that Auschwitz or the 
Holocaust has never happened is not protected by the freedom of expression under article 5 of 
the German Basic Law. 138 This classification is confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court 
which stated that the Auschwitz Deception is a proved wrong assertion of facts. 139 This would 
apply to statements such as "Scientific experiments show that gas was never used to kill 
people, but just for disinfections." or "Just I million Jews died during World War II." 
However, one has to consider that these statements may not be reducible to the single and 
isolated assertion of a wrong fact. They are often made in a context, which describes the 
whole historical process and are mixed up with judgmental comments. This is the case in 
135 
Boll [ 1980] 54 BVerfGE 208, 219 (DE) (FCC); Stefan Huster "Das Verbot der ' Auschwitzliige' , die 
Meinungsfreiheit und das Bundesverfassungsgericht" (1996) 8 NJW 487. 
136 
Han s Jarass in Hans Jarass and Bodo Pieroth Grundgesetz far die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and Kommentar (7 
ed, CH Beck, Munich, 2004) article 5 para 5 Gem1an Basic Law. 
137 
Strafrechtliche Bell'ertung der Leugnung der Judenvernichtung, above n 122 , 250. 
138 
The alternatives of approval and downplaying require judgmental elements even by its wording. However, the 
"simple" Auschwitz Deception is covered by the denial and therefore medium of the analysis. 
139 . . ' 
Strafrecht/1che Bewertung der Leugnung der Judenvermchtung, above n 122, 249. 
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statements like "The Genocide practised by Nazi Germany against Jews and Gypsies did not 
exist, but is to be regarded as a myth, a fable, or a hoax." or "The exaggerated proclaimed 
number of 6 million dead Jews is not attributable to the use of gas chambers but to the fact 
that they could not stand the workload." Therefore, this kind of statement would fall within 
the scope of article 5 of the German Basic Law as it would be covered by the third category, 
acknowledged by the Federal Constitutional Court. 
3 Limits to the Right of Freedom of Expression 
When implementing section 130 (3) GCC, legislature failed to see that the Auschwitz 
Deception often contains judgmental elements so that article 5, as well as its permissible 
restrictions, may be applicable. Courts confirmed this understanding by foregrounding the 
distinction between judgmental statements and wrong facts. However, one has to take in 
mind the above mentioned scenario, the "simple" Auschwitz Deception mixed up with a 
judgmental statement. The addition of judgmental elements does not change the "simple" 
Auschwitz Deception to an "aggravated" one
140
, as the latter one requires additional elements 
such as "the assault of the human dignity" 141 . Whenever a separation of opinion and wrong 
fact would distort the statement as a whole, one has to see it as a unit which falls within the 
scope of article 5. 142 Therefore, one has to scrutinise whether section 130 (3) GCC in the form 
of the "simple" Auschwitz Deception is a permissible restriction to the freedom of expression. 
(a) Overview 
Article 5 (2) of the German Basic Law states that "these rights shall find their limits in 
the provisions of general laws, in the provisions for the protection of young persons and in the 
right to personal honour". First of all, one could think of a right to personal honour to justify 
section 130 (3) GCC as a limitation to freedom of expression. However, one has to take into 
consideration the genesis of the law and its legally protected good. As the provision of the 
"simple" Auschwitz Deception purposes to protect the public peace, and not the human 
dignity or the honour of the people, who suffered from the ational Socialist regime 1
43
, "the 
140 But see Winfried Brugger, above n 4, 396, 
141 Gemrnn Criminal Code, s 130 (I) no 2. 
142 However, the courts refuse from doing so as they do not want to make the partial unconstitutionality a subject 
of discussion . 
143 Stefan Huster, above n 133, 488 with further comments regarding the habits of the courts, which nonetheless 
argue with human dignity to justify section 130 (3) of the Criminal Code. 
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right of personal honour" cannot be the relevant justification. However, one can think of a 
justified limitation under the "provisions of general laws". 
(b) Analysis of the term "general law" 
"The concept of 'general laws' was controversial from the very beginning." 144 The 
Federal Constitutional Court has developed several theories which ought to simplify the 
interpretation of the term, such as the special right theory (Sonderrechtslehre) and the theory 
to balance the legally protected interests (Abwagungslehre), which are combined in the 
German jurisdiction. The special right theory requires that the freedom of expression limiting 
provisions must not prohibit an opinion or the expression of an opinion as such. 145 Although it 
is discussed controversially what is meant by special right 146, there exists consensus that a 
provision, which goes against a particular opinion, is a special right. All other 
implementations and nuances of the special right theory require even stricter criteria, so that 
the consensus is the minimal content of the theory. 
Applying this abstract interpretation to the prov1s1on of the prohibition of the 
"simple" Auschwitz Deception at hand, it is arguable that section 130 (3) is a model case for 
the interpretation of the tem1 "special right" as it prohibits a particular opinion, the denial of 
the Holocaust. This means, that the provision may be unconstitutional in the case of the 
"simple" Auschwitz Deception in a judgmental context. 
(c) How to solve the problem 
The inaccuracy of the law is more of a theoretical problem, which is slightly dogmatic, 
than a problem ofreality as the courts refuse to make a big issue out of section 130 (3) and its 
unconstitutionality in certain cases. However, this dogmatic inaccuracy needs to be solved. 
(i) Abandoning of the special right theory 
One solution could be to refrain from the special right theory. Instead, the courts could 
only focus on the question whether the freedom of expression limiting provision, such as 
144 
Donald P Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Republic of Germany (Duke University Press, 
Durham and London, 1989) 372. 
145 Stefan Huster, above n 133,489. 
146 
Walter Schmitt Glaeser "Die Meinw1g freiheit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts" (1972) 
97 AoeR 276, 281; Donald P Kommers, above n 144 , 376. 
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section 130 (3) GCC serves the purpose to protect a legally protected good, which is of such a 
high value, that it justifies trumping the freedom of expression. 147 With regard to the German 
history and the legally protected good under section 130 (3), the conservation of the public 
peace, one could endorse a balancing in favour of section 130 (3) in case of the "simple" 
Auschwitz Deception in a judgmental context. 
However, this does not seem to be a preferable solution. The Federal Constitutional 
Court has developed the special right theory over decades with important motives, trying to 
obtain the dogmatic underlying article 5 of the German Basic Law. Article 5 is one of the 
most important and most fundamental rights which is provided under the German law. It aims 
to ensure the democratic process which derives from free speech without censorship. 
Therefore, it is elementary, that provisions do not prohibit a certain and particular opinion, but 
are neutral to be within the scope of protection. This becomes even more important in the case 
of political speech as a foundation of democracy. Just to concentrate on the theory of 
balancing the legally protected interests does not seem to lead to the same result, the non-
alignment of opinion in a democratic state. Thus, one has to hold onto the special right theory. 
(ii) Limitations deriving from the Constitution 
Moreover, one could try to justify section 130 (3) GCC as a limitation to the freedom 
of expression using conflicting constitutional law instead of using the limitation of the 
"general laws". 148 Such a solution, however, is not feasible. The German Basic Law contains 
a particular regulation and pattern regarding the limitation of the individual fundamental 
rights. While some fundamental rights mention other fundamental rights, liberties or 
constitutional principles 149 to justify a limitation, others require a "simple" or an "aggravated" 
limitation 150 . Moreover, there are some fundamental rights, which do not mention the 
possibility of a justified limitation at all. However, it is acknowledged that these rights may be 
restricted by the conflicting constitutional law, which means the law of a constitutional value. 
Applying this rule to article 5 of the Basic Law requires that the provision itself does not 
147 Stefan Huster, above n 133, 489; Bodo Pieroth and Bernhard Schlink Grnndrechte Staatsrecht 2 (24 ed, C F 
Mi.iller, Heidelberg, 2008), 646. 
148 Ibid, 341; Stefan Huster, above n 133, 489. 
149 Donald P Kommers, above n 144, 366. 
150 As an example: article 9 (2) of the Basic Law contains an explicit limitation in the rights of the constitutional 
order, a "simple" lin1itation means through or on the basis ofa statute as e.g. article 2 (1). Aggravated 
limitations require statutes which fulfil certain circumstances, such as article 5 (2), 10 (2). Other articles do 
not mention a limitation at all , 5 (3). 
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mention the possibility of a limitation at all, but article 5 (2) does. It mentions the provisions 
of general laws, which describes an "aggravated" limitation. Therefore, one can argue that a 
use of clashing constitutional law would breach the imperious pattern of the German 
Constitution. This would create a precedent. Moreover, the "breach" could be misused in 
other circumstances, to justify limitations to fundamental rights, which were not intended by 
the Constitution. Thus, governmental influence could extend to the disadvantage of the 
fundamental rights and therefore, democracy. 
(iii) Revision of jurisdiction 
The solutions of abandoning the special right theory or to use other limitations are 
based on the level of limitation of the freedom of expression. However, they cannot solve the 
maccuracy, which derives from the facts , that the "simple" Auschwitz Deception in a 
judgmental context falls under the scope of article 5 and that section 130 (3) does not 
constitute a pern1issible limitation to the freedom of expression. They are even creating 
greater dogmatic problems. Therefore, a revision describing the scope of protection seems to 
be more appropriate. 
As seen above, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a highly complicated 
jurisdiction regarding opinions, facts and a mixture of both to prevent a reduction of the 
protection under article 5.151 This leads to the normative undesirable result that the assertion 
of facts in a judgmental context, which can implicate a more negative effect, is privileged 
towards the factual assertion of fact. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court should 
clarify in its jurisdiction that courts should really try to separate the judgmental and factual 
elements of a statement to guarantee the most extensive protection under aiiicle 5. Moreover, 
the Constitutional Court should emphasise that statements, whose judgmental element is 
based on a false fact , do not fall under the scope of protection regarding article 5, where a 
distinction of the different elements is impossible. This is especially important, as reality 
shows that courts try to classify a judgmental Auschwitz Deception as a false fact anyway, to 
deny the protection under article 5 (1) of the Basic Law. 
151 
Wahlkampf/CSU: NPD Europas (1982) 60 BVerfDE I, 8 (DE) (FCC) ; Hans Jarass in Hans Jarass and Bodo 
Pieroth Grundgesetz flir die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and Kommentar, above n 136 , article 5 para 3 German 
Basic Law. 
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It is obvious, that the classification of a Holocaust denial statement, whether it is just 
factual or judgmental, as a false fact, means a restriction to the scope of protection which is 
guaranteed under article 5. However, the judgmental element in these circumstances is based 
on a false fact and one has to ask, whether a different solution to solve the inaccuracy would 
not lead to more drastic restrictions to the right of freedom of expression. The prohibition of 
the Holocaust denying law, stated under section 130 (3) GCC certainly is an exceptional case, 
which has to be as unique and exceptional as the acts committed under the ational Socialist 
regime, whose denial is prohibited by the law. A revision or clarification of the jurisdiction 
however, seems to be the less radical restriction for the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression . 
D Conclusion 
The German statutory law prohibits the so called "simple" Auschwitz Deception under 
section 130 (3) GCC. The implementation of this section was followed by a political 
controversy, but did not create a legal debate as the German Federal Constitutional Court 
found that false facts, such as the denial of the Holocaust do not fall within the scope of the 
freedom of expression. However, in theory the "simple" Auschwitz Deception can contain 
judgmental elements which leads to the consequence that such statements are protected under 
the freedom of expression. As section 130 (3) GCC cannot be classified as a general law 
required under article 5 (2) of the Basic Law to justify a limitation to the freedom of 
expression, the Federal Constitutional Court should revise its jurisdiction. 
V THE NEW ZEALAND RESPONSE TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL 
With reference to a phone call with Mr Paul Warhurst , Infonnation Adviser of the 
New Zealand Human Rights Commission, New Zealand has a low score on the problem of 
Holocaust denial. Mr Warhurst mentioned, that just one complaint regarding "Holocaust" had 
been reported to the Race Relations Office in 2006. However, this statistical number does not 
protect New Zealand from the problem of neo- azi political movements and the occurrence 
of Holocaust deniers in the future as can be seen from latest happenings in Canterbury. 
Therefore, this paragraph will scrutinise whether Holocaust denial is prohibited under the 
current New Zealand legislation and its impacts of freedom of expression. 
40 
A The Absence of an explicit Law against Holocaust Denial 
Like other common law countries the New Zealand legislation does not offer a 
Holocaust denial law that explicitly makes it a criminal offence to deny ce1iain facts about the 
Holocaust like Germany. However, the legal framework provides several hate-speech laws, 
under the Human Rights Act 1993, which might cover Holocaust denial as well. 152 
B Covering of Holocaust Denial by New Zealand's Hate Speech Laws 
1 Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 
The following, it is analyses whether the denial of the Holocaust is capable of falling 
under the criminal hate speech provision, provided under section 131 HRA. It prohibits the 
incitement of racial disharmony. 153 
(a) Genesis of the law 
New Zealand has legally faced the problem of the incitement of racial disharmony 
since the enactment of the Race Relations Act in 1971, in particular by enacting section 25. 
Prior to this, various legal means, such as the offence of sedition and a criminal libel offence 
under the Crimes Act 1961, were used to prevent acts which might promote racial 
disharmony. 154 One of the main reasons for the implementation of a special law to "uphold 
the rights of racial minorities to equality and dignity and to live free from discrimination" 155 
was in order to satisfy article 4 (a) of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 continues the 
criminal offence first established by the Race Relations Act 1971. 
(b) Legally protected good 
Section 131 covers not only words considered likely to excite hostility or bring groups 
into contempt (as in section 61), but also words considered likely to excite ill-will or bring 
groups into ridicule.
156 
One of the reasons for this law is the avoidance of harm. The provision 
152 
This paper focuses on the criminal matter of the Human Rights Act, section 13 I. 
153 
For the wording of section 131 see Appendix 3, I. 
154 
Juliet Moses, above n 12, 186; Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth , above n 3 194. 
155 ' Juliet Moses, above n 12, 185. 
156 
Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth, above n 3, 209; Human Rights Commission, above n 59, 11. 
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permits punishment of a person for statements they have made because of what other people 
might be led, as a result, to think about still another group of people, or racial or ethnic 
group.
157 
Considering section 131 from the harm perspective, it aims to protect the targeted 
groups, those groups as a collective and, by extension, society as a whole. 158 Evidence for 
society as a protected good can also be found in the documents relating to the predecessor of 
section 131 HRA, the Race Relation Act, as 159 
Speech should be free unless some specific harm, such as public disorder results or is 
reasonably anticipated ... the public order element is seen as important not only because it 
limits the restraint on speech but also because it introduces a comparatively certain objective 
element in an area of subjectivity. 
Thus the provision takes up the two targets being hit by harm, the individual target as 
well as the who le society in the form of public peace and order. 
(c) Statement of facts 
However, section 131 and its predecessor have rarely been used, 160 which might be 
reasoned by the specific requirements of the provision. 
As provided under section 131, a person must not publish, distribute or broadcast 
spoken or written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting with the intent to excite 
hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in ew 
Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of 
persons. 161 First of all, similarly to the German law, speech is not capable to be prohibited 
under section 131, if it was only spoken at home. The section requires a publication or 
distribution to the public at large or to members of the public. Secondly, the grounds of racial 
disharmony are interpreted broadly. 162 
157 Human Rights Commission "The Right of Freedom of Opinion and Freedom of Expression" 
www.hrc.eo.nz/report (acces ed I O November 2009). 
158 See ibid. 
159 Robert Hallowell "Racial Disharmony: A General Explanation" (13 .03 .2006) Commentary sent by Paul 
Warhurst, Information Adviser of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, via email. 
160 ll1e only decision wider section 25 of the Race Relations Act was in King-Ansell v Pol ice [ 1979] 2 NZLR 
531 , however, just concentrating on the question whether the phrase "ethnic origin" could apply to Jews. 
161 Human Rights Act 1993, s 131. 
162 See Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth , see above n 3 , 199. 
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The first question that arises is what one has to understand by "threatening, abusive or 
insulting". To assess whether the words are threatening, abusive or insulting, one can adopt 
the test of the reasonable person in the position of the person or group alleged to be 
discriminated against. This test was first used by the Tribunal in Proceedings Commissioner v 
Pryor 163 in relation to section 61, the civil arm of the Human Rights Act. As 131 HRA is 
broader than section 61, but contains the same words and as there is no jurisdiction solely 
relating to section 131 , one can apply the definitions underlying section 61. Moreover, 
although the words seem to suggest a requirement of intention, it is clear that words may be 
considered, for example, insulting regardless of the intention with which they were spoken. 164 
In addition, the speech has to be "likely to excite hostility or illwill against, or bring 
into contempt or ridicule". This criterion requires a high threshold to prevent unwananted 
incursion into the right to freedom of expression 165 ; it reflects the real danger of hate speech. 
To assess whether speech is likely to influence the audience and to increase the risk of 
manifestation of hostility or contemptuous behaviour depends on the extent to which others 
are racist, or are considered capable or being influenced by racist expression. 166 Huscroft 
criticises that the decision whether racist expression was persuasive, is made by a human 
rights body and thus, might depend on the enthusiasm of those charged with the responsibility 
for enforcing it. 167 However, the Tribunal has worked out some criteria in former decisions 168 
taking into account the sensitivity ofNew Zealanders, humour and stereotyping. 169 Moreover, 
with regard to the fact that section 131 has never been used, one can confute that the provision 
might catch less extreme propaganda. To require actual proof - such as postulated by 
Dickson CJ in the Canadian Supreme Court 170- would not fully remove politisation, but 
increase speculation subjectivity since it would be necessary to assess the recipients prior 
feelings towards the target group and any changes following the comments. 171 This subjective 
factor could create a loophole as for example more rational recipients might be less 
influenced. 
163 Proceedings Commissioner v P,yor [1993] l ERNZ 358. 
164 See Grant Huscroft and Paul Ri sh worth, see above n 3, 204. 
165 Robert Hallowell , see above n 159, 21. 
166 Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth, see above n 3, 205. 
167 Ibid . 
168 
See Proceedings Commissioner v Archer [1996] 3 HRNZ 123 , 129; Neal v Sunday News Auckland Newsaper 
Publications (1985) EOC 76299. 
169 
These aspects can also be found in Human Right Commission "Exciting Racial Disharmony Discussion Paper 
on section 9A of the Race Relations Act 1971 which makes it Lmlawful to excite racial dishannony'' (1984) 6-
8. 
170 R v Keegstra, see above n 80. 
17 1 See Juliet Moses, above n 12, 189. 
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"The criminal arm of the HRA is unambiguous in its requirement of intent"
172 
following from the fact that section 131 creates an offence and criminalisation and thus, as 
leading to far-reaching consequences, needs special justifications and is a high threshold of 
mens rea. The criterion of intent might lead to different difficulties. While on the one hand it 
might be hard to have evidence for a speaker's intent, on the other hand, it might protect those 
who are misled by others. Thus, although section 131 is potentially broader than section 61, it 
seems that section 131 contains insufficiencies, which might led to a restrictive application of 
the criminal provision. This is stressed by the fact that a prosecution under section 131 
requires the consent of the Attorney-General. 
2 Holocaust Denial under section 131 of the Human Rights Act 
As there has been no case of denying the Holocaust, it is hard to say whether this 
might be covered by section 131 HRA. However, this paper examines this question 
considering the examples set out under the German response to Holocaust denial. 
As "threatening, abusive and insulting" does not require a subjective element but is 
proved on the standard of reasonable person, there is little doubt that a sentence like 
"Scientific experiments show that gas was never used to kill people, but just for 
disinfections." or "Just 1 million Jews died during World War II." will not fulfil the criterion. 
Holocaust denying statements in a judgmental context 173 might be able to fulfil the criteria as 
they contain a plus. They do not "only" deny the Holocaust, but might contain opinions, 
which would insult a reasonable person. Considering the "pure" Holocaust denial statement, 
this first criterion might even be hard to overcome, as Holocaust denying literature usually 
avoids insult and threat. It deliberately seeks credibility by using mild, pseudo-scientific 
language. 174 
However, it is harder to assess whether Holocaust denial is capable of being " likely to 
excite hostility or illwill against, or bring into contempt or ridicule any group of persons". 
One can argue that we expect people or at least well-educated people, not being influenced by 
these statements, as them being part of history, not only Germany's, but the world's history. 
172 Tessa May Bromwich "Balancing freedoms: A critique ofNew Zealand's hate speech legislation in light of 
the New South Wales and Victorian Experience (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2005) 13. 
173 See IV B I. 
174 Geoffrey Bindman, above n 7, 467. 
44 
However, the recent incident in Canterbury - without assessing that the students intended to 
excite hostility or illwill or being influenced by Holocaust denying statements - shows, that at 
least "ignorance" as Lincoln Vice-Chancellor Roger Field put it, is the reason for such a 
behaviour. Having this in mind, it is not w1likely that a Holocaust denying statement could 
fulfil the criterion under section 131. 
As stated above, the intention of a speaker is likely to be difficult to prove. Referring 
agam to the Canterbury incident, it was mentioned that the students were not driven by 
"malicious intent" 175 However, it is not entirely impossible to prove such intention in cases 
where the statement contains explicit hatred against Jews. Moreover, the Court of Appeal 
found in King-Ansell v Police 176 that Jewish people in New Zealand, most likely the target of 
Holocaust denial, form a group with common ethnic origins and thus, fall under the protection 
of section 131. 
The analysis has shown that Holocaust denying statements in a judgmental context -
considering all the thresholds and obstacles, such as the consent of the Attorney General - at 
least to a certain degree - are capable of falling under section 131. However, it seems to be 
very unlikely, that statements, such as the "simple Auschwitz Deception" would fall under the 
scope of the provision as it is up to the human rights body's discretion whether a reasonable 
person is threatened or insulted by these words. Considering the manipulative language of 
Holocaust deniers it seems that this objective test might fail. 
C New Zeala11d's Hate Speech Laws a11d Freedom of Expression 
As section 131 HRA regulates hate speech and possibly Holocaust denying statements 
in a judgmental context, one can argue that this means it is a limitation of the freedom of 
expression which is guaranteed in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(BORA). Therefore, one has to ask whether the legal prohibition is within the scope of the 
valid limitations provided under section 14 BORA. Analysing this question one has to have in 
mind that the BORA is not supreme law, but that Parliament may enact provisions that cannot 
be struck down just because of its inconsistency with the BORA. 177 
175 
See "University apologises for students in Nazi garb", above n 8. 
176 King-Ansell v Police , above n 160. 
177 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. ll1e New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 evolved out ofa White Paper proposal 
to establish a supreme law constitutional bill of rights. However, in the end it turned out a ordinary 
legislation, ee Paul Rish worth and others The Nell' Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 
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1 Hate speech under the scope of protection of section 14 BORA? 
Section 14 of the New Zealand BORA guarantees freedom of expression. It states, that 
"everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and opinions of any kind in any form." Similar! to the German regulation, 
although mentioning "opinion" specifically, the fundamental right guarantees freedom of 
expression in a broader context. "The right appears sufficiently broad to include anything that 
may be written or said, without regard to the nature of a particular communication or the 
context in which it occurs."
178 Moreover, the first judgments after the enactment of the 
BORA, concerned with freedom of expression, state its broad understanding as well. In Diiff v 
Communicado Ltd Lord Blanchard stated that "expression should be defined widely, and that 
questions of limits on the right should generally be determined pursuant to section 5." 
179 In 
Solicitor-General v Radio NZ LTD "What is guaranteed [by s 14] is the right to everyone to 
express their thoughts, opinions and beliefs however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the 
general opinion or to the particular opinion of others in the community." 
180 This statement is 
also published in the handbook on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 by the Ministry 
of Justice, whose guidelines help ensure that policies, practices and legislation are developed 
consistently with the BORA.
181 Hence, the large and liberal interpretation given to freedom of 
expression suggests that the optimal approach is to balance the contextual values and factors 
in section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
182 
The last statement supports the issue that limits on rights should involve "ad hoe 
balancing". Under the ad hoe balancing methodology all expressive activity except acts of 
violence would fall within the meaning of "free expression" and the Court would then 
proceed to assess the reasonableness of particular limits on those forms of expression imposed 
by the law in issue.
183 However, the New Zealand law is not clear on whether to take this 
approach or not. One can also argue in favour of a definitional balancing 1
84
, requiring Courts 
to produce a definition that would read in inherent limitations so as to exclude protection for 
obscenity, child pornography and may be hate speech in the form of wrong facts, such as 
Melbourne, 2003) 168. 
178 Paul Rishworth and others, above n 177,31 1. 
179 Dujf v Communicado Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 89, 99. 
180 Solicitor -General v Radio NZ Ltd [ 1994] I NZLR 48, 55. 
181 See Ministry of Justice The Handbook of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: An Introduction to the 
Rights and Freedoms in the Bill of Right · Act for the Public Sector (Wellington, 2004) 54. 
182 Ibid , 20. 
183 See Petra Butler and Andrew Butler, above n 106, 120. 
184 Ibid . 
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Holocaust denial. Such an approach was found in other judgments as well. 185 However, 
considering the location of section 5, it suggests that issues of limiting rights should be 
considered separately from the question of the scope of freedom of expression. 
As courts have not found so far, whether wrong facts, such as the denial of the 
Holocau t fall in the scope of section 14, one can only assume its practical outcome. As 
assessed above, purely Holocaust denying statements might not even fall under section 131 of 
the HRA and thus, one might not even come to the question whether section 131 of the HRA 
as a hate speech law interferes with the freedom of expression. From this perspective, one can 
argue, that at least those statements, including a judgment or opinion, such as "The 
exaggerated proclaimed number of 6 million dead Jews is not attributable to the use of gas 
chambers but to the fact that they could not stand the workload." may fall under the scope of 
section 14 of the BORA. Excluding certain areas of speech and expression would render 
section 5 redundant. 186 The same is valid, considering the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms on which the New Zealand courts have drawn heavily on the case law. 187 In R v 
Zundel the offence was an unjustified restriction on freedom of expression as the restriction as 
the doctrine of content-neutrality protects falsehoods as well as truths, particularly since the 
question of whether a statement is true or false can be determined only by reference to its 
content. 188 Thus, one might divine that New Zealand courts would even decide that the purely 
denying of the Holocaust or the simple Auschwitz deception would fall in the scope of section 
14 of the BORA. 
2 Hate speech as a just[fied limitation to freedom of expression 
Assuming that Holocaust denying statements - at least those made in a judgmental 
context - would fall under section 131 of the HRA, but under the protection of section 14 of 
the BORA as well, one has to examine whether the New Zealand hate speech law in its form 
of section 131 of the HRA is a justified limitation to the freedom of expression. Section 5 of 
the BORA provides that 189 
185 Solicitor-Genera/ v Radio NZ Ltd, see above n 180, 59-60. 
186 See Petra Butler and Andrew Butler, above n 106, 122. 
187 
Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson The law of Human Rights (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
New York, 2009) 1518. 
188 R v Zundel, see above n I 87,731 ; Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, above n 1518, 1514. 
189 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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(a) 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
General overview of section 5 of the BORA 
Section 5 of the BORA has to be seen within the context of sections 4 and 6. As 
mentioned above, courts cannot strike down laws being inconsistent with the BORA. Section 
4 requires the enactment despite their inconsistency. However, this comes only into play if the 
legislation cannot be given a meaning that is consistent with the BORA by virtue of section 6 
of the BORA and if any limitation on the right cannot be demonstrably justified in terms of 
section 5. 190 
Determining whether a limitation is justified, the Court of Appeal has developed a test 
in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review
191 which was confirmed by the New 
Zealand Supreme Comt in R v Hansen 1
92
. The test has its origin in the Canadian case law, at 
first set out in R v Oakes. 193 The test requires several steps, described by Richardson J as 
follows: 194 
[A)n abridging inquiry under section 5 will properly involve consideration of all economic, 
administrative and social implications. In the end it is a matter of weighing: 
(1) the significance in the particular case of the values underlying the Bill of Rights Act; 
(2) the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the particular right protected by the 
Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) the limits sought to be placed on the application of the Act provision in the particular case; 
and 
(4) the effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put forward to justify those 
limits. 
Tipping J summarised these points in R v Hansen
195 that a limitation is justified when the 
"limiting measure serve[s] a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right 
or freedom", when "the limiting measure [is] rationally connected with its purpose"; when the 
190 Moonen v Film & Literature Review Board [2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
191 Ibid . 
192 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7. 
193 R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103 (CSC). 
194 Richardson J refers to Reference Re Public Sen•ice Employee Relations Act (Alta) [ 1987] 1 SCR 313 rather 
than Oakes, but the test quoted from that case by Dickson CJC ist he Oakes test. 
195 R v Hansen, see above n 192, at para l 04, Tipping J. 
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"limiting measure impair[s] the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for 
sufficient achievement of its purpose and when "the limit [is] in due proportion to the 
importance of the objective". 
(b) Application of the test regarding hate speech 
Regarding the first criterion one has to assess whether the objective underlying hate 
speech gains sufficient impo1iance. The above analysis of the harm rationale has shown that 
hate speech laws aim to protect the society and the target groups from the dissemination of 
hate speech. In particular the denying of the Holocaust in a judgmental context can cause a 
denigration of those who suffered incarceration in the Nazi concentration camps. Moreover, 
these statements are able to insult the memory of relatives and the whole society, depriving 
part of the society their history. This poses the danger of leading to further discrimination and 
hostility. Thus, hate speech is of great social concern and of sufficient importance. 
Section 131 of the HRA, punishing racial disharmony aims to protect the entire society 
as well as the targeted group from harm. 196 Thus, the "limiting measure is rationally 
connected with its purpose" . This applies to hate speech in general, as well as to Holocaust 
denying statements in a judgmental context. Moreover, the test requires that the interference 
with the right of freedom of expression is as little as possible. As seen above, section 131 of 
the HRA contains some obstacles and high threshold which have to be overcome. The 
requirement of intent, for example, ensures, that in the particular case, only those people will 
be prosecuted, who deny the Holocaust intentionally. If, for example, in the Lincoln 
University case - presuming that all other criteria are fulfilled - a court or tribunal was not 
able to prove that the students acted intentionally to create illwill 197 , this would not result in a 
prosecution. Considering the thresholds of the provision, the interference with the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression is as little as possible. This can be stressed by the 
fact , that there has only been one prosecution under the predecessor of section 131 of the 
HRA. 
As a last requirement under the test , the limitation has to be in reasonable proportion 
to the importance of the objective. As outlined above hate speech and its particular form of 
Holocaust denial is capable of having a destabilising and divisive effect on society. It is an 
196 See above V B I b) . 
197 " University apologises for students in Nazi garb", above n 8. 
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affront to the target's group dignity which causes it to suffer detrimental effects. 
198 Revisiting 
the initially mentioned approach of Holocaust deniers and anti-Semites, to establish the 
political ideas of the Nazi times, it seems more than proportional to limit freedom of 
expression to this extent, as it is the goal of Holocaust deniers to undermine these 
fundamental freedoms entirely. Thus it is adequate and proportional to protect the society and 
the democratic order by limiting freedom of expression. 
Thus, the limitation on freedom of expression imposed by section 131 of the HURA 
appears to be justified in light of section 5 of the BORA. However, a contrary finding would 
still require courts to apply the provision. 
D Conclusion 
As analysed so far, the New Zealand law does not provide a specific law prohibiting 
the denial of the Holocaust. However, it is possible, that Holocaust denying statements made 
in ajudgmental context are capable of falling under section 131 of the HRA and thus, lead to 
a criminal offence. The examination has shown that other statements, such as the simple 
Auschwitz deception are unlikely to be covered by section 131 , as the provision requires 
insult or threat. Holocaust deniers however, use manipulative language and may avoid this 
criterion. Although there has not been a case under the New Zealand law relating to Holocaust 
denial and section 131 , it appears further, that these statements would fall under the scope of 
section 14 of the BORA, but would be reasonably justified with regard to section 5 of the 
BORA. This result seems to be consistent with the New Zealand law and its understanding of 
freedom of expression. 
To exclude Holocaust denying statements or in general false facts from the scope of 
protection under section 14 would ignore the two-stage process suggested by the BORA, the 
proper delineation of the broad scope and the reasonableness of any limits. 
199 This ensures a 
more transparent analysis and enables an individual assessment. Moreover, the comparative 
constitutional experience also favours this methodology. As the White Paper of the BORA 
was "based closely ons 1 of the Canadian Charter"
200 which manifests the two-stage process, 
it is consistent to take it as a basis for the understanding of the BORA. 
198 See Juliet Moses, above n 12, 195. 
199 See Petra Butler and Andrew Butler, above n 106, 12 1. 
200 White Paper, para 10.26 p 71. 
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VI GERMANY VERSUS NEW ZEALAND, HOLOCAUST DENIAL LAW VERSUS 
HATE SPEECH LAW - WHICH APPROACH TO PREFER? 
Having analysed the different responses to Holocaust denial, it is necessary to draw a 
comparison, pointing out the common characteristics, differences as well as advantages and 
disadvantages of the approaches. 
As examined, the German law does not only provide prov1s1ons regarding racial 
incitement, but also an explicit Holocaust denial law under section 130 (3) of the GCC, which 
makes the simple Auschwitz deception a criminal offence. In contrast, the New Zealand legal 
framework contains a general criminal hate speech law under section 131 of the HRA, which 
requires high thresholds regarding its criteria as well as the consent of the Attorney General. 
Thus, one can say that the German legal framework states a better protection against 
Holocaust deniers. Phrases like "Six million did never die" and "There have been no gas 
chambers in Auschwitz" or "Auschwitz and its concentration camps is a lie" are capable of 
falling under section 130 (3) of the GCC, whereas it is doubtful that a reasonable person in 
ew Zealand would find the statements threatening, abusive or insulting. This might be 
indicated by the fact that for example the "Holocaust" incidents resulting in a complaint 
reported to the Human Rights Commission, are rare. It is more likely that Holocaust denying 
statements mixed with opinion and judgment are degrading and thus, insult a targeted group 
or the entire society. Hence, the New Zealand law contains loopholes. Holocaust deniers 
might have greater freedom to disseminate their ideas and revisionist statements, while the 
German law provides far-reaching provisions gaining to encompass all kinds of Holocaust 
denying statements. 
However, from the perspective of Deborah Lipstadt, the New Zealand response to 
Holocaust denying literature and statements is preferable201 
Rather than law, there is another "weapon" in our arsenal. That is the quick and forceful 
condemnation by scholars, political and religious leaders, and the people of stature of denial 
and deniers. 
One can argue that by providing different provisions, the German law gives Holocaust deniers 
a greater likelihood to appear in court rooms, to attract attention and to use courts as a stage 
20 1 
Interview with Deborah Lipstadt "Defending History: Deborah E Lipstadt and Holocaust Denial" (ll1ree 
Monkeys Online, November 2006) www.threemonkeysonli.ne.com (accessed 8 October 2009). 
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for their false and denying statements. As these cases enjoy great popularity with special 
regard to the media, Holocaust deniers might even increase the number of their audience by 
being on everyone's lips. 
Moreover, the analysis has shown that the New Zealand framework contains another 
advantage as it seems to be more consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 
especially freedom of expression, than section 130 (3) of the GCC in relation to article 5 of 
the German Basic Law. This is likely to be caused by the different developments and state of 
the fundamental rights catalogue. While Germany protects freedom of expression under its 
Constitution and thus, it is subject to the very complicated regulations of limitations and 
dogmatics, the New Zealand BORA protects freedom of expression with the state of an 
ordinary law, being able to be restricted by the general restriction of section 5. As a 
consequence, the current German legislation contains insufficiencies regarding Holocaust 
denying statements made in a judgmental context as these are not capable to constitute a 
justified limitation of article 5 of the Basic Law. As section 130 (3) prohibits a particular 
opinion or statement, the denying of the Holocaust, it creates a special law, which does not 
qualify as a justified limitation. Considering the law from a theoretical point of view it is not 
precise. In accordance with the dogmatics underlying the German constitution, its freedoms 
and scope of protection, it is recommended to qualify Holocaust denying statements in a 
judgmental context as a wrong fact and thus, to deny them the scope of protection under 
article 5. 
In contrast, is remains questionable whether a similar provision (such as section 130 
(3) of the GCC) would be a justified limitation under section 5 of the New Zealand BORA. 
The section is not interpreted to that effect that a restriction must not prohibit a certain kind of 
opinion. However, applying the above mentioned test
202 it is unlikely that such provision 
would fulfil the requirements such as the proportionality to the importance of the objection. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that New Zealand courts - following the Canadian jurisdiction -
would exclude wrong facts , such as Holocaust denying statements, from the scope of 
protection regarding freedom of expression. Thus - although inconsistency would not lead to 
the striking down of a provision - the current ew Zealand approach is more consistent and 
complying within the construct of freedom of expression than the Gennan one. 
202 See V B 2 b) . 
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However, it remams questionable which response 1s favourable. Although the 
Holocaust caused outrageous harm and victims, the recent incidents - whether in Germany, 
New Zealand or at an international level - show that people forget this paii of history or at 
least do not care and display ignorance. The harm caused by this behaviour is even increased 
by the fact , that well-educated and academic individuals, such as Irving and Williamson 
disseminate their thoughts and statements with persuasiveness and straightforwardness, being 
capable of establishing their ideas in countries, other than the origin of the Holocaust. The 
recent incident at Lincoln University shows that New Zealand - although geographically 
thousands of miles apart from the origin of Holocaust - is not immune from the appearance 
Holocaust denying ideas or the ridiculing of these times. It is unacceptable that such 
behaviour is being apologised with regard to the fact, that New Zealanders are not conscious 
about the Holocaust and its context. 
Because of the different "Holocaust denial" - approaches and as the Holocaust is 
Germany' s direct history, it seems inappropriate to provide the same solution for both 
countries. The German law should stick to its provisions, especially section 130 (3) as 
abolition would have a great political impact. As being the country which is responsible for 
the happenings during World War II a11d because of the intensified and pervasive incidents of 
Holocaust denial, anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism within Germany, section 130 (3) provides a 
legitimate and adequate response to the phenomenon of Holocaust denial. However, courts 
should clarify the scope of protection regarding freedom of expression and emphasise that 
Holocaust denying statements, whose judgmental element is based on a false fact , do not fall 
under the scope of protection regarding article 5. 
This paper proposes that the New Zealand legislation should not introduce a specific 
Holocaust denial law, but stick to its general hate speech law provided under section 131 of 
the HRA. However, the legislator should narrow the thresholds of the criteria under section 
131 of the HRA and simplify the proceeding under that section to ensure that it does not run 
idle but states a functioning and balancing protection against the harm caused by Holocaust 
denying statements. One could think of deleting the requirement of the consent of the 
Attorney General as well as simplifying the proof intent. With regard to the importance of the 
objective, such amendment would still be likely to meet the requirements set out in the tests 
under section 5. 
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Deborah Lipstadt is right: truth, history and education gain high importance to fight 
against Holocaust deniers. However, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Allowing 
hate speech such as Holocaust denying statement can subvert the marketplace of ideas. 
VII CONCLUSION 
This paper began by pointing out the rationales underlying hate speech and freedom of 
expression and its application to Holocaust denying statements. Throughout the paper, it has 
been shown that the German law provides far-reaching provisions criminalising Holocaust 
denying statements, in particular the "simple Auschwitz Deception" under section 130 (3) 
GCC. However, it was highlighted that the current section 130 (3) interferes with the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression, as wrong facts in a judgmental context fall within 
the scope of protection of the fundamental right, but section 130 (3) does not qualify as a 
general law and thus, is not a justified limitation to the freedom of expression. Hence, to solve 
the appearing insufficiencies, the Constitutional Court should emphasise that statements, 
whose judgmental element is based on a false fact , do not fall under the scope of protection 
regarding article 5 of the Basic Law. 
In contrast, it has been shown that the New Zealand law criminalises hate speech in 
general. It was highlighted that Holocaust denying statements are mostly not capable of 
falling under the scope of section 131 HRA as the provision requires the fulfilment of high 
thresholds and strict criteria. Thus, the New Zealand legislation should narrow the 
requirements of the provision to fight against Holocaust deniers. Thus, with regard to the 
differences between the countries, their history and legal approaches to fight against 
Holocaust denial, one can say, that a limitation of freedom of expression regarding Holocaust 
denial is justified within the boundaries of the two systems. 
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VIII APPENDICES 
A Appendix 1: Historians' Estimates of Jewish Losses in Each Country 
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B Appendix 2: German Legislation 
1 Section 13 0 of the German Criminal Code 
Incitement to hatred 
( 1) Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace 
I . incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 
2. assaults the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming segments of the 
population, 
shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years. 
(2) Whosoever 
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; or 
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I. with respect to written materials (section 11 (3)) which incite hatred against segments of the population or a 
national, racial or religious group, or one characterised by its ethnic customs, which call for violent or arbitrary 
measures against them, or which assault the hwnan dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning or 
defaming segments of the population or a previously indicated group 
(a) disseminates such written materials; 
(b) publicly displays, posts, presents, or otherwise makes them accessible; 
(c) offers, supplies or makes them accessible to a person under eighteen years; or 
(d) produces, obtains, supplies, stocks, offers, annow1ces, commends, undertakes to import or export them, in 
order to use them or copies obtained from them within the meaning ofNos (a) to (c) or facilitate such use 
by another; or 
2. disseminates a presentation of the content indicated in No 1 above by radio, media services, or 
telecommunication services 
shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine. 
(3) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of 
National Socialism of the kind indicated insection 6 (1) of the Code oflntemational Criminal Law, in a manner 
capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine . 
(4) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the 
victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of arbitrary force shall be liable to 
imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine. 
(5) Subsection (2) above shall also apply to written materials (section 11 (3)) of a content such as is indicated in 
subsections (3) and (4) above. 
(6) In cases under subsection (2) above, also in conjunction with subsection (5) above, and in cases of 
subsections (3) and (4) above, section 86 (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
table of contents 
2 Article 5 Basic Law 
Freedom of Expression 
(I) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech , writing and 
pictures, and to in fom1 himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and 
freedom ofreporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
(2) ll1ese rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young 
persons, and in the right to personal honour. 
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C Appendix 3: New Zealand legislation 
1 Section 131 of the Human Rights Act 1993 
Inciting racial disharmony 
(I) Every person commits an offence and is liable on sunm1ary conviction to imprisonment for a tem1 not 
exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or 
bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic 
or national origins of that group of persons,-
(a) Publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or broadcasts by 
means of radio or television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or 
(b) Uses in any public place (as defined in section 2( I) of the Sw11111ary Offences Act 1981 ), or within the 
hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have 
access, words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting,-
being matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any such 
group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group 
of persons. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, publishes or distributes and written matter have the meaning given to 
them in section 61 of this Act. 
2 Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Freedom of Expression 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information 
and opinions of any kind in any form. 
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3 Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Justified limitations 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
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